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AT YOUR SERVICE: LAWYER DISCRETION TO ASSIST
CLIENTS IN UNLAWFUL CONDUCT
Paul R. Tremblay*
Abstract
The common, shared vision of lawyers' ethics holds that lawyers
ought not collaborate with clients in wrongdoing. Ethics scholars caution
that lawyers "may not participate in or assist illegal conduct," or "giv[e]
legal services to clients who are going to engage in unlawful behavior
with the attorney as their accomplice." That sentiment resonates
comfortably with the profession's commitment to honor legal obligations
and duties, and to remain faithful to the law.
The problem with that sentiment, this Article shows, is that it is not an
accurate statement of the prevailing substantive law. The American Bar
Association's (ABA) model standards governing lawyers prohibit
lawyers from assisting clients with illegality, but only in certain defined
categories-that is, crimes and frauds. The standards, adopted by
virtually all states, do not prohibit participation by lawyers in the
remaining universe of unlawful conduct. The aim of this Article is to
understand the meaning and scope of this apparent acceptance of lawyers'
collaboration with unlawful client action. Surprisingly, legal ethics
commentary has not explored the nature of the constraints on such
collaboration.
This Article offers, as orienting examples, three stories from the
entrepreneurial startup world in which clients have requested legal help
with activities that are unlawful but may not be criminal or fraudulent.
The stories provide a base from which to explore whether all wrongdoing
or illegality ultimately equates to something criminal or fraudulent.
Examining the text and history of Model Rule 1.2(d), this Article
demonstrates that the ABA (and, presumably, the states that adopted the
language) intended the Rule's limitation to mean what it says. Some
lawyer participation with unlawful action might be prohibited through the
operation of "other law." In general, however, no outside authority limits
a lawyer's assistance with client wrongdoing-if "unlawful" activity
equates to wrongdoing. The startup stories show that "unlawful" is not
always synonymous with "wrongful," although, of course, it often will
be.
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Lawyers therefore have discretion-but, as this Article shows, no
duty-to aid clients in some activities that are illegal. Lawyers must
exercise that discretion responsibly, even where no legal sanction or
penalty would apply. Relying on the "moral activism" insights that
inform lawyer decision making in determining how aggressively to assert
legal entitlements when third-party interests are at stake, this Article
concludes that lawyers ought to resist aiding those clients whose unlawful
actions engender moral harm or injustice.
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INTRODUCTION
Individuals and businesses sometimes engage in conduct that the law
forbids or propose schemes that include unlawful components. Those
individuals and businesses often have lawyers working with them and
hope to obtain from their lawyers some form of aid in the unlavful
activity. That reality is well-known, of course. The expected response to
that reality is to prohibit lawyers from providing such assistance,1 and to
craft professional protocols through which lawyers might maintain some
distance between their legitimate representational duties and the illegal 2
conduct in which their clients engage. 3 The challenges emerging from
that response are intricate and knotty, and do not lack for commentary.4
Ethicists debate whether ostensibly neutral advice about the law
encourages or assists wrongdoing, and if so, what constraints on such
advice might be warranted.s Jurisprudence scholars assess the benefits
1. See, e.g., W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW 52 (2010) (a "lawyer
may not assist the client in illegality"); id. at 59 ("Lawyers may lawfully do for their clients only
what their clients lawfully may do.").
2. This Article employs the term "illegal," and its equivalent "unlawful," intentionally to
include anything that the law prohibits or penalizes, or for which the law imposes some form of
liability. Whether some action that fits that definition ought to be deemed illegal or unlawful is a
question that this Article addresses in its analysis. See infra text accompanying note 138.
3. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in
Legally Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 669, 676 (1981) ("[A] lawyer may ... [riefuse
to aid or participate in conduct that he believes to be unlawful, even though there is some support
for an argument that the conduct is legal.").
4. See generally id. (providing a leading and insightful exploration of this issue).
5. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Taking Cues: Inferring Legality from Others' Conduct, 75
FORDHAM L. REv. 1429, 1431 (2006); Donald C. Langevoort, Someplace Between Philosophy
and Economics: Legitimacy and Good Corporate Lawyering, 75 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1615, 1616,
1618 (2006); John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REv. 959, 979, 1051, 1054-
55 (2009); Joel S. Newman, Legal Advice Toward Illegal Ends, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 287, 288-89
(1994); Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits ofthe Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence
and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1547, 1609-10 (1995) [hereinafter Pepper,
25320181
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and costs of legal counseling given its potential-and one might say its
tendency-to encourage unlawful acts that otherwise might not occur.6
And policy mavens formulate models of the "lawyer as gatekeeper" to
encourage, or even require, lawyers to police lawbreaking among their
clients-especially powerful corporate wrongdoers.? All of this rich and
sophisticated work has as its ultimate aim the minimization of legal
assistance to, or encouragement of, wrongdoing.
This Article addresses a strikingly different component of the reality
of client lawbreaking. Notwithstanding the efforts and policy aims just
described, the professional standards governing lawyers appear to
provide almost unfettered permission for lawyers to assist their clients in
certain forms of lawbreaking activity. As one prominent observer has
written, "The 1983 Model Rules [of Professional Conduct] .. . do not
limit a lawyer's advice, [or] even encouragement, to a client about
unlawful acts so long as the acts are not criminal or fraudulent." 8 That
Counseling]; Stephen L. Pepper, Three Dichotomies in Lawyers'Ethics (with Particular Attention
to the Corporation as Client), 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETeICs 1069, 1073, 1110-11, 1114 (2015)
[hereinafter Pepper, Three Dichotomies].
6. See, e.g., Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Richard Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the
Adversary System? A General Theory ofLitigation Advice and Its Regulation, 79 CALIF. L. REV.
313, 316-17, 319 (1991) [hereinafter Bundy & Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary
System?]; Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Elhauge, Knowledge About Legal Sanctions, 92 MICH.
L. REv. 261, 261-64 (1993) [hereinafter Bundy & Elhauge, Knowledge About Legal Sanctions];
Louis Kaplow, Information and the Aim ofAdjudication: Truth or Consequences?, 67 STAN. L.
REV. 1303, 1318 (2015); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to
Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability, 102 HARv. L. REV. 565, 568 (1989).
7. "The literature on attorney gate-keeping post-Enron is voluminous." Milan Markovic,
Subprime Scriveners, 103 Ky. L.J. 1, 4 n.19 (2014-2015) (referring to the accounting scandal
accompanying the collapse of the Enron corporation in 2001); see also JoHN C. COFFEE, JR.,
GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 192-244 (2006) (discussing
lawyers as gatekeepers for corporate clients); Melanie Garcia, The Lawyer as Gatekeeper: Ethical
Guidelines for Representing a Client with a Social Change Agenda, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETICs 55 1,
552 (2011) (analyzing lawyers as gatekeepers of acts of social change); Thomas D. Morgan,
Comment on Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 375, 378 (2007) (arguing that
lawyers should be viewed as counselors, not gatekeepers); David Nersessian, Business Lawyers
as Worldwide Moral Gatekeepers? Legal Ethics and Human Rights in Global Corporate Practice,
28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1135, 1183-87 (2015) (arguing that lawyers should hold corporate
clients accountable based on human rights principles and ethical guidelines); Fred C. Zacharias,
Coercing Clients: Can Lawyer Gatekeeper Rules Work?, 47 B.C. L. REv. 455, 478, 501 (2006)
[hereinafter Zacharias, Coercing Clients] (arguing that the gatekeeping rules in the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct do not always have the intended effect of encouraging moral decisions
by clients); Fred Zacharias, Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1389 (2004)
(discussing lawyers' roles as gatekeepers to prevent client misconduct) [hereinafter Zacharias,
Lawyers as Gatekeepers].
8. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 704 (1986). Charles Wolfram served
as the Chief Reporter for the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law Governing
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opinion, shared by many other commentators,' derives from the language
of the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional
Conduct-language adopted by and still in place today in almost all of
the states in the country'o-prohibiting a lawyer from counseling or
assisting a client in conduct "that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent[.]"" Chosen by the ABA in 1983, that phrase was "intended
by the framers of the rule to be substantially narrower than the
proscription in"12  the ABA's previous Code of Professional
Responsibility, which covered all "illegal" conduct.13
The lawyers' regulatory apparatus thus appears to sanction a wide
swath of assistance of direct client wrongdoing. This Article is an effort
to understand the scope and the implications of this apparent license to
aid and abet client wrongdoing, as those topics remain surprisingly under-
examined. But the questions here are more complicated still.
Notwithstanding Professor Wolfram's assertion in his respected treatise1 4
and the language and history of Rule 1.2(d), legal ethics scholars
regularly declare, well after the 1983 Model Rule adoption, that lawyers
categorically may not assist clients in "illegal" or "unlawful" conduct.
For example, Professors Fred Zacharias and Bruce Green write that
lawyers "may not participate in wrongdoing"' 5 or "knowingly participate
in illegality and fraud."' 6 Other similarly respected commentators make
comparable contentions, proposing that lawyers may not assist clients
with any unlawful conduct. 1 7 Indeed, Professor David Wilkins has
Lawyers. Charles W Wolfram, CORNELL L. SCH., http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/faculty/
bio.cfm?id=183 (last visited Nov. 19, 2017).
9. See, e.g., Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. & Eugene R. Gaetke, The Ethical Obligation of
Transactional Lawyers to Act as Gatekeepers, 56 RUTGERS L. REv. 9,65 (2003); Martin H. Malin,
Ethical Concerns in Drafting Employment Arbitration Agreements After Circuit City and Green
Tree, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 779, 817 (2003); Carl A. Pierce, Client Misconduct in the 21st Century,
35 U. MEM. L. REV. 731, 906 (2005).
10. See infra text accompanying note 139.
11. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR AsS'N 2014).
12. WOLFRAM, supra note 8, at 705.
13. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (AM. BAR ASS'N 1980).
14. WOLFRAM, supra note 8, at 704 ("The 1983 Model Rules [of Professional
Conduct] ... do not limit a lawyer's advice, even encouragement, to a client about unlawful
acts. . . .").
15. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1, 16 (2005).
16. Id. at 51.
17. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and Revival of
a Professional Norm, 33 EMORY L.J. 271, 292 (1984) ("The law cannot license some of its
subjects, least of all 'lawyers,' to assist in the commission or concealment of transactions that it
defines as serious wrongs ... . To do so would license lawyers to be instruments for subverting
the structure of law itself."); Ryan Morrison, Turn Up the Volume: The Need for "Noisy
Withdrawal" in a Post Enron Society, 92 KY. L.J. 279, 304 (2003-2004) (noting that the Model
2552018]1
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described the norm that holds that "zealous advocacy stops at 'the bounds
of the law"' as "the one relatively fixed star in the legal ethics universe."' 8
On occasion, but not uniformly, such commentators reference another
Model Rule, one that seems to undercut the rather clear message of Rule
1.2(d). Model Rule 1.16(a)(1) declares that a lawyer must cease work for
a client, or refuse such work, if "the representation will result in violation
of the rules of professional conduct or other law."l9 Assisting a client
with noncriminal or nonfraudulent unlawful action would be expected to
frequently result in a violation of some "other law." The Rules, then,
seem to have competing messages for the lawyers who must honor them.
This Article's aim is to make some sense of this puzzle.
This Article addresses the inquiry in the following way. It first offers
three lawyering stories to provide some context for the proceeding
discussion. Each story involves an entrepreneurial startup business
enterprise. Startup businesses typically have scant money and resources
and complying with the law often imposes palpable costs. It is not
unusual, observers report, for sympathetic and well-meaning startup
founders to seek to skirt some regulatory requirements and to use lawyers
in that part of their business just as they do in other components of the
business. Those presumably sympathetic examples set the stage for us to
explore the limits of lawyers' assistance of such businesses with the
requested illegal activity.
With the stories serving as context, this Article then addresses the
language of Rule 1.2(d), along with its historical development, to tease
out the apparent message therein that lawyers have some liberty to aid
clients in lawbreaking 20 so long as the aid does not involve a crime or
fraud. That inquiry invites an analysis of whether all wrongdoing or
illegality ultimately equates to something criminal or fraudulent. If that
were so, then Rules 1.2(d) and 1.16(a)(1) would harmonize. But it is not
so, and the three startup stories help demonstrate why much unlawful
conduct is neither criminal nor fraudulent. The lawyers in at least two of
the three stories would have good-faith questions about whether the Rules
limit their assistance or not. Those questions deserve clearer answers,
Rules "prevent an attorney from giving legal services to clients who are going to engage in
unlawful behavior with the attorney as their accomplice"); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (AM. BAR Ass'N 1980) ("In his representation of a client, a
lawyer shall not ... [clounsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or
fraudulent.").
18. David B. Wilkins, In Defense ofLaw and Morality: Why Lawyers Should Have a Prima
Facie Duty to Obey the Law, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 269, 269 (1996) (quoting MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBLITY Canon 7 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1994)).
19. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.16(a)(1) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2014) (emphasis
added).
20. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2014).
256 [ Vol. 70
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even if the ABA, and the states that adopt the ABA's standards, opt not
to provide them.
This Article determines that the most reliable reading of Rule 1.2(d)
in context is that the rule means what it says. The analysis shows that
Rule 1.16(a)(1)'s more general language is imprecise and not intended to
undercut the former rule. That conclusion will be an educated guess at
best, based on the most sensible interpretation of the available authorities.
Under this interpretation, lawyers do have discretion under the
professional guidelines to assist clients in a wide array of illegal activity.
This Article then explores the limitations that "other law"-from
outside of the profession-imposes on lawyer assistance of client
wrongdoing. Perhaps the ban missing from the Model Rules arrives from
other doctrine or regulatory constraints. That inquiry leads to two
fmdings. First, in the presence of such other legal constraints, a lawyer
has professional discretion to aid in illegal behavior if the lawyer is
willing to accept the costs of doing so. Second, there are many instances
where no such outside constraints exist, as the discussion below will
show.
We thus end up with three permutations of lawyer assistance with
client misconduct:
(1) The lawyer assists the client with criminal or
fraudulent activity. Such assistance is expressly forbidden
by the regulatory apparatus.
(2) The lawyer assists the client with noncriminal or
nonfraudulent activity where the lawyer risks some potential
penalty or sanction from outside authority. The lawyering
regulatory apparatus permits such assistance, but the lawyer
must be willing to accept the risk of detection and the
resulting costs.
(3) The lawyer assists the client with noncriminal or
nonfraudulent activity where the lawyer risks no penalty or
sanction from outside authority for offering such assistance.
The lawyering regulatory apparatus permits such assistance.
Those permutations prompt an apparent consequential question: If the
authorities provide lawyers permission to assist in categories (2) and (3),
does that permission imply a duty to aid a client whose representation
would be benefitted by such aid? The answer to that question instinctively
must be no, and, relying in part on Rule 1.16(a)(1), this Article concludes
that a lawyer has discretion to refuse to provide such assistance.
Having covered the doctrinal, law-of-lawyering questions that
practicing lawyers ought to understand, this Article then concludes with
two more reflective goals. It hypothesizes, admittedly without much
evidence, the possible reasoning behind the ABA's express decision to
7
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allow some assistance with illegality in the Model Rules. 2 1 It then
connects that discussion to a more metalevel inquiry about the message
Rule 1.2(d) communicates to lawyers, and to the larger society, about the
duties to honor the law. Within contemporary legal ethics discourse, the
justification for obeying the law has been the topic of lively debate,
especially as it applies to instances where adherence to the law results in
a morally troublesome result.2 2 In that debate, all sides seemingly agree
that, absent that morally troublesome factor, citizens owe a presumptive,
or prima facie, duty to obey properly enacted or issued laws and judicial
authority.
This Article visits that debate and shared baseline commitment to
argue that the best ethical understanding of the ABA's stance in its
enactment of Rule 1.2(d) (and the states' later adoption of the same
provision) is connected to the lawyer's moral duties in the face of clear
law. The ABA and the states cannot be saying that they approve of
lawyers ignoring noncrime and nonfraud laws whenever those laws
interfere with their clients' interests or wishes (even though that is what
the letter of their lawmaking seems to communicate). Instead, this Article
argues, lawyers may only take advantage of the discretion the ABA and
the states provide in settings where doing so would advance justice or
morality. No other understanding seems plausible. This Article then
applies that interpretive turn to the three stories that began it.
I. THREE LAWBREAKING STORIES
To understand the limits of lawyer assistance with unlawful conduct,
it helps to situate the legal and philosophical questions on the ground, in
practice, with actual lawyering stories. This Article offers three such
stories, each necessarily rather thin as a hypothetical, but with enough
texture to serve its purposes. Each involves a lawyer working with a
business startup client. Startup clients need help in every sort of way,
including guidance from lawyers. 2 3 But startups are cash- and resource-
21. As noted above and developed in more detail below, the predecessor to the Model
Rules, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated by the ABA in 1969 and
adopted by all states soon thereafter, prohibited lawyer assistance with all illegality. See MODEL
CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7102(A)(7) (AM. BAR Ass'N 1980) ("In his representation
of a client, a lawyer shall not ... [clounsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to
be illegal or fraudulent."). The 1983 Model Rules changed that provision to limit the prohibition,
and the ABA resisted efforts to broaden the ban during the drafting and approval process. See
infra text accompanying notes 57-72.
22. See, e.g., WENDEL, supra note 1, at 57; David Luban, Misplaced Fidelity, 90 TEx. L.
REV. 673, 688 (2012) (reviewing Wendel's book).
23. See Darian M. Ibrahim, How Do Start-ups Obtain Their Legal Services?, 2012 Wis. L.
REv. 333, 346 (noting the importance of legal advice to startups); Susan R. Jones, Small Business
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poor, pretty much by definition.2 4 Startup clients also encounter many
regulatory and other legal hurdles with which compliance can be
expensive and distracting. 25 The client's incentive to fly under the radar,
and to operate outside of the formal requirements at least until they are
on a more solid financial footing, is great.2 6 Startup lawyers, therefore,
might find themselves quite interested in the limitations imposed by the
bar on their assistance with the under-the-radar operations of their
innovative, scrappy clients. They can therefore serve as apt examples of
the questions to be explored here.
Of course, not all clients who seek advice and assistance from lawyers
with illegal activity are sympathetically resource-poor like prototypical
startups. Most of the stories that generate scholarly treatment of the
problem of lawyer assistance with wrongdoing involve multinational
corporations engaged in some dreadful-if clever and creative-business
decisions that cause serious harm to consumers or others. 27 If we
and Community Economic Development: Transactional Lawyering for Social Change and
Economic Justice, 4 CLINICAL L. REv. 195, 232 (1997).
24. See Therese Maynard, Ethics for Business Lawyers Representing Start-Up Companies,
11 WAKE FOREST J. Bus. & INTELL. PROP. L. 401, 405 (2010-2011); Alison R. Weinberg & Jamie
A. Heine, Counseling the Startup: How Attorneys Can Add Value to Startup Clients'Businesses,
15 J. Bus. & SEC. L. 39, 43 (2014) ("Startups are cash-poor and time-strapped .... ); Sona
Karakashian, Note, A Software Patent War: The Effects of Patent Trolls on Startup Companies,
Innovation, and Entrepreneurship, 11 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 119, 144 (2015) ("Startup companies
are cash-poor....").
25. See Lee A. Harris, Taxicab Economics: The Freedom to Contract for a Ride, 1 GEO.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 195, 203 (2002) ("Typically, . . . it is legal or technical barriers, rather than_
natural barriers, that make the start-up costs for potential entrepreneurs prohibitively high.").
Conservative commentators decry, perhaps with some exaggeration, the costs and difficulties
associated with regulations that affect startups. See, e.g., James L. Gattuso & Diane Katz, Red
Tape Rising: Five Years ofRegulatory Expansion, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER (Mar. 26,
2014), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/03/red-tape-rising-five-years-of-regulatory
-expansion.
26. Why Your Startup Needs a Compliance Function, COMPLYGLOBAL (July 29, 2015,
10:29 AM), http://www.complyglobal.com/blog/why-your-startup-needs-a-compliance-function
("It's almost a clich6 that the startup founder focuses on getting more business while neglecting
[compliance]."). Observers of business lawyers generally note the demand by management for
"the work-around" when legal or regulatory hurdles interfere with the business development. See
Lawrence M. Friedman et al., Laws, Lawyers, and Legal Practice in Silicon Valley: A Preliminary
Report, 64 IND. L.J. 555, 563 (1989) ("They say, 'OK, here's what we want accomplished. Here's
the legal problem. What's the work-around?' That's literally the vocabulary they use, and they
assume there's a legal barrier somewhere. They don't mean, 'How do I violate the law?' but 'How
do I structure the deal, so I don't have that problem?"').
27. The examples of this are, of course, far too many to cover here. For a brief sample, see,
e.g., Marianne Jennings & Lawrence J. Trautman, Ethical Culture and Legal Liability: The GM
Switch Crisis and Lessons in Governance, 22 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 187, 189 (2016); Donald C.
Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers' Responsibility for
Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REv. 75, 106 (1993); W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as
2592018]
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conclude that assistance with some lawbreaking is acceptable for lawyers
working with likeable startups, we will then need to discern whether any
principled considerations would limit that same kind of assistance to
more powerful, less honorable actors.28
One other noteworthy quality of the three stories: Each describes
lawyering assistance that is transactional. It does not situate the lawyer
in the role of advocate or litigator. A common theme within legal ethics
discourse is that transactional lawyers engaged in proactive counseling
about future conduct ought to take a more conservative stance regarding
the potential for a client to cross the line demarcating permitted and
forbidden conduct. 29 A litigator makes her arguments publicly before an
opposing party or lawyer, or before a judge or similar arbiter. She might
push the limits of her advocacy given the protections inherent in that
systemic arrangement. 30 A counselor, by contrast, encounters fewer
institutional constraints, and therefore, as the ethics teachers tell us, she
ought to adopt a more principled and realistic approach to her advising. 3 1
Interpretation, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1167, 1167 (2005) (explaining attorneys as a "but-for cause" of
accounting scandals of the early 2000s). Tax advisors in particular encounter, with some
regularity, the tension between the financial interests of their business clients and the demands of
the tax laws. See BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 2
(4th ed. 2008); Bret N. Bogenschneider, Professional Ethics for the Tax Lawyer to the Holmesian
"Bad Man," 49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 775, 803 (2016); Leubsdorf, supra note 5, at 979.
28. As Stephen Pepper writes, "The kind of client we imagine ... will tend to determine
where we come down on issues of lawyer's ethics. . . ." Stephen Pepper, Why Confidentiality?,
23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 331, 332 (1998). Pepper uses the example of a well-meaning but cash-
strapped startup business to provide a relatively sympathetic client for purposes of examining
confidentiality duties. Id; see also Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70
N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1402 (1992) ("Stories must be told to create even the semblance of a shared
understanding of what the rules require.").
29. See, e.g., David Luban, Rediscovering Fuller's Legal Ethics, II GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
801, 809 (1998); Paula Schaefer, Harming Business Clients with Zealous Advocacy: Rethinking
the Attorney Advisor's Touchstone, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 253 (2011) (criticizing the bar for
not limiting zeal in business-counseling contexts). This well-accepted ethical principle became
more prominent and relevant after the President George W. Bush administration's reliance upon
the "torture memos." See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 159, 176-80
(2007); Jesselyn Radack, Tortured Legal Ethics: The Role ofthe Government Advisor in the War
on Terrorism, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 4 (2006); W. Bradley Wendel, Deference to Clients and
Obedience to Law: The Ethics of the Torture Lawyers (A Response to Professor Hatfield), 104
Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 58, 58, 61 (2009), http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestem.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1217&context-nulr_online; Marisa Lopez, Note, Professional
Responsibility: Tortured Independence in the Office ofLegal Counsel, 57 FLA. L. REV. 685, 716
(2005).
30. WENDEL, supra note 1, at 13.
31. See Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161 (1958) ("Partisan advocacy plays its essential part in
[litigation], and the lawyer pleading his client's case may properly present it in the most favorable
light. A similar resolution of doubts in one direction becomes inappropriate when the lawyer acts
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With those considerations established, here are the three startup
stories for our consideration.
A. The Independent-Contractor Story
Foley, Haile & Lingos (FHL) is a small, progressive law firm
established by three recent law-school graduates who hope to sustain a
practice representing cutting-edge startup enterprises. Emily Haile is one
of the three founding partners of FHL. Haile has been assisting an
entrepreneur, Jackson Sanchez, with WorkHub, Inc., a new business he
has been developing for the past couple of years consisting of a website
and app that help startups, professionals, and others find coworking space
that fits their needs and price constraints. In Sanchez's words, the model
resembles "Airbnb for coworking spaces." Haile organized WorkHub as
an S corporation with Sanchez as the majority shareholder, board
president, and CEO. Sanchez's sister and her wife are also on the board
and own some of the company's shares of stock.
Sanchez has been working informally with two friends from college,
Diane Bilder and Paulo Vose, to develop the coding and algorithms
needed for the business model to work. Sanchez has asked Haile to
prepare for WorkHub an independent-contractor agreement for Bilder
and Vose that will include confidentiality, nondisclosure, and
noncompete provisions. 32 WorkHub's arrangement with the two coders
is that the company will pay each of them $200 per week for about forty
hours of work each week, and will offer each a restricted stock agreement
as further compensation for their efforts.33 WorkHub can most likely
afford that commitment, although the cash payment arrangement will be
as counselor."); see also Robert P. Lawry, The Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 19
HOFSTRA L. REv. 311, 335 (1990) (stating that one of the principle responsibilities of a lawyer in
the role of counselor is to counsel against lawbreaking and fraud); Kevin H. Michels, Lawyer
Independence: From Ideal to Viable Legal Standard, 61 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 85, 103 (2010)
("[T]he reasons for allowing attorneys wide expanse in their presentation of arguments apply only
in the advocacy setting; they have no force in the advice or counseling role.").
32. See Martin M. Shenkman & Allan R. Freedman, Employees, Independent Contractors
and Similar Relationships in the Close Corporation, 142 N.J. LAW. 32, 35, 36 (1991) (noting that
the confidentiality and non-disclosure provisions protect the security of the payor's information,
while the non-compete provision restricts the contractor from working for a similar business in a
local area during a defined period of time); Robert W. Wood, Drafting Independent Contractor
Agreements, 33 Wyo. LAW. 53, 53 (2010) (discussing how an independent-contractor agreement,
which need not be in writing, sets forth the terms of the contract between the person performing
services and the payor for those services).
33. See Brett R. Turner, Classifying Restricted Stock Plans, 23 FAM. ADvOc. 33, 33 (2001)
("In a restricted stock plan, an employee acquires legal title to company stock as soon as a grant
is made. The grant is subject, however, to a series of restrictions, which provide that the employee
must return the stock to the employer unless certain conditions are met. The most common
restriction is a requirement that the employee work for the employer for a set number of years.").
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tight given the business's meager bank account balance. WorkHub will
offer Bilder and Vose no other benefits.
For present purposes, let us assume what in many jurisdictions and
contexts would be undoubtedly true: The arrangement described by
Sanchez fails to comply with state or federal wage and hour laws if the
coders qualify as employees, which they do. 34 The $200 per week
payment given the hours worked calculates to less than minimum wage
even at the federal rate. 35 As employees, the coders are entitled to
unemployment insurance protection and workers' compensation benefits,
expenses WorkHub cannot afford to provide. 36 WorkHub is required to
pay a portion of the coders' FICA payroll taxes and to withhold the
remainder of FICA, along with state and federal income taxes.37
WorkHub does not have the capacity or the dollars to arrange for those
payroll logistics.
We may assume further, for whatever purposes it serves, if any, that
Bilder and Vose are satisfied with this arrangement and may suspect that
the deal is not entirely aboveboard or technically in compliance with
whatever regulatory schemes might exist. We may also assume, on
similar terms, that Sanchez and WorkHub have committed to alter the
employment terms to come into full compliance when WorkHub has
adequate financing in place.
The final critical chapter of this story is this: Haile counsels Sanchez
and the other two board members about her legal conclusions regarding
the regulatory requirements for hiring workers in this way, including the
risks of discovery (minimal) and the sanctions likely to be imposed if the
arrangement did come to the attention of state or federal enforcement
authorities (more unclear; quite harsh if enforced to the letter,38 but a
distinct possibility of discretionary lax response by officials 39). Having
34. See David Bauer, The Misclassfication of Independent Contractors: The Fifty-Four
Billion Dollar Problem, 12 RUTGERS J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 138, 145 (2015) (noting that the nation's
basic employment laws differ depending on whether a worker is classified as an independent
contractor or an employee); Jenna Amato Moran, Independent Contractor or Employee?
Misclassification of Workers and Its Effect on the State, 28 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 105, 106, 122
(2009-2010) (observing that independent contractors and employees are not subject to the same
degree of protection of wage and hour laws).
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C) (2012) (noting that the federal minimum wage is $7.25
per hour).
36. Bauer, supra note 34, at 145.
37. Id. at 139, 147, 148.
38. See Christopher Buscaglia, Crafting a Legislative Solution to the Economic Harm of
Employee Misclassification, 9 U.C. DAVIs Bus. L.J. 111, 122-27 (2009) (discussing the lack of
statutory authority that state governments possess when trying to control worker
misclassification).
39. Id. at 128-29 (noting that employers who cheat gain an unfair competitive advantage).
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considered Haile's advice with great care, Sanchez and the WorkHub
board instruct Haile to develop the independent-contractor agreements.
B. The Nonprofit-Solicitation Story
Jonathan Shin is a second-year associate assigned to the tax
department of the large national law firm Gould Peabody. His department
head has assigned Shin to assist, on a pro bono basis, a new nonprofit
organization called Advancement of Multilingual Justice (AMJ), through
its founder, Ehsan Rahman. Shin has created a state nonprofit corporation
and, as required by state law, submitted registration papers to the Office
of the Attorney General, which will issue a "Certificate of Solicitation"
within several weeks. 4 0 Once AMJ has that certificate, it may lawfully
solicit funds in the state or on the internet generally.4 1 It may solicit funds
with that certificate in place even before it obtains its tax-exempt status
from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), although the donors will take
the risk that their donations might end up as not tax-deductible. 42
Rahman informs Shin of his plans, supported by the AMJ board of
directors, to solicit funds immediately without the certificate in order to
take advantage of some grant-funding opportunities and reach some
sympathetic supporters. Some of the donors live out of state. Rahman
would like Shin's advice about that plan, and if possible, his help in
developing the solicitation strategy and materials.
40. For an example of how the Office of the Attorney General in Massachusetts requires
such a certificate, see Registering a Public Charity, OFFICIAL WEBSITE Arr'Y GEN. MASS.,
http://www.mass.gov/ago/doing-business-in-massachusetts/public-charities-or-not-for-
profits/registering-a-public-charity/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2017).
41. See NAT'L Ass'N OF STATE CHARITY OFFICIALS, THE CHARLESTON PRINCIPLES
GUIDELINES ON CHARITABLE SOLICITATIONS USING THE INTERNET 2 (2001), http://www.nasconet.
orglwp-content/uploads/2011/05/Charleston-Principles-Final.pdf (discussing how the National
Association of State Charities Officials (NASCO) has adopted principles that address solicitation
over the internet). These principles conclude that an out-of-state charity should be regulated in a
particular state only if it "i. Specifically targets persons physically located in the state for
solicitation, or ii. Receives contributions from the state on a repeated and ongoing basis or a
substantial basis through its Web site." Id. at 3; see also Tracy L. Boak, Navigating the Maze of
State Charitable Fundraising Regulation, 27 TAX'N EXEMPTS 38, 38 (2015) (discussing the
financial, reporting, and compliance requirements for charitable fundraising).
42. See I.R.C. § 508(d)(2) (2012) (stating that the IRS will ordinarily certify an
organization's tax-exempt status retroactive to the date of its formation, if a proper application is
filed in a timely fashion and that donations given before the IRS has determined that an
organization is tax-exempt would be deductible to the donor when the retroactive designation
occurs).
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C. The Trademark-Licensing Story
Dara Bowman directs a law school clinic focusing on startups and
entrepreneurship. Her student, Anatoly Litmanovich, has been assigned
to work this semester with Winterport Graceful Movement (WGM), a
program of innovative music and dance instruction. WGM is a small and
struggling but growing for-profit company which has developed some
increasingly popular programs within the local community. Its founder
and CEO is Yolanda Moreno.
Moreno has asked Litmanovich to create a licensing agreement for the
company. The clinic helped WGM to obtain a federal trademark
registration for its name and logo, and the business uses both extensively
in the local area. A former teacher from WGM, Juan Toledo, has asked
Moreno if he could open a version of WGM in Santa Monica, California,
where he now lives. Moreno loves the idea, but she wants to make sure
that the California program follows the WGM model precisely.
Litmanovich's research shows that California has pretty strict and
elaborate franchising requirements 4 3 -stricter than those that apply to all
states through the Federal Trade Commission." If WGM proposed a
licensing agreement to Toledo, it would be much less expensive and
complicated for both parties. The problem is that if Moreno exercises the
level of control she insists upon, the "licensing agreement," regardless of
what it might be labeled, will qualify as a franchise arrangement, and will
be subject to the state and federal requirements.
Moreno understands the implications of the clinic's advice. She opts
to proceed with a licensing agreement with Toledo's permission and his
understanding that the law might technically require the parties to
proceed in a different way. She and Toledo are each willing to take the
risks after the clinic explains them in great detail.4 5 Moreno asks
Litmanovich to create the licensing agreement documents for her and
Toledo to sign.
Each of these three stories entails a client proceeding with a strategy
that is not in compliance with the relevant substantive law and requesting
counsel's active assistance with that strategy. After a review of the
existing constraints on the lawyer's discretion to offer such assistance,
this Article will return to each story to assess the limits, if any, on the
lawyer's permission to provide such assistance.
43. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31000-31516 (West 2017); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10,§ 310.011-.011.1 (2017).
44. See FTC Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising Rule, 16
C.F.R. § 436.2-.5 (2017).
45. Litmanovich's offering explanations of the arrangement to Toledo, the licensee, while
he represents WGM, the licensor, raises interesting questions under Model Rule 4.3, but for
present purposes we shall assume (and correctly so) that this discussion is proper. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT r. 4.3 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2014).
264 [Vol. 70
LAWYER DISCRETION TO ASSIST CLIENTS IN UNL4 WFUL CONDUCT
II. THE BASELINE SUBSTANTIVE LAW ON ASSISTANCE WITH
UNLAWFUL CONDUCT
Addressing whether lawyers have some liberty to aid their clients in
lawbreaking, so long as the aid does not involve a crime or a fraud, invites
an analysis of whether all wrongdoing or illegality ultimately equates to
something criminal or fraudulent. That analysis must begin with a careful
reading of baseline substantive law relating to assistance with unlawful
conduct.
A. The Role of the Baseline Substantive Law
The analysis of the startup lawyer's role responsibilities must begin
with as clear an understanding as we might achieve of the underlying
substantive doctrine and standards governing assistance with unlawful
activity. If the available black-letter law governing lawyers (either as
lawyers or as citizens generally) prohibits startup counsel from assisting
with illegal client conduct, then the ethical duties of lawyers such as
Emily Haile, Jonathan Shin, or Anatoly Litmanovich are relatively
straightforward. Those duties in that context would not necessarily be
unambiguously clear, because we would have to consider whether the
legal-realist and contextualized understanding of that black-letter law
provides the lawyer some practical discretion to assist in some fashion.4 6
By contrast, if the black-letter law does not unambiguously prohibit such
assistance, then counsel such as Haile, Shin, or Litmanovich would need
to discern the limits-if any-of their participation.
For convenience, let us rely primarily on the story of Jonathan Shin
and AMJ as our context for this substantive law discussion, as it is the
simplest of the three. Recall that AMJ is requesting Shin's assistance with
charitable solicitation efforts that are not lawful under state regulations. 47
For our present purposes, we now know that this regulatory violation is
neither criminal nor fraudulent.4 8
B. The Meaning of "Assistance"
The aim of this Article is to test the proposition that a lawyer may
actively assist a client with conduct that the lawyer concludes is unlawful;
46. See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARv. L. REv. 468, 508-09
(1990) [hereinafter Wilkins, Legal Realism]; David B. Wilkins, Some Realism About Legal
Realism for Lawyers: Assessing the Role of Context in Legal Ethics, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE:
ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 25, 26-27 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012)
(exploring that question) [hereinafter Wilkins, Some Realism).
47. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
48. For a more contextual examination of that proposition in this factual setting, see infra
text accompanying notes 277-79.
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that is, in violation of some civil duty or administrative obligation. Before
proceeding to examine that question, we need to be clear about this
Article's understanding of "assistance." This Article does not question
whether a lawyer may counsel a client about the meaning of a legal
authority, its reach, its enforcement, and the consequences of its breach,
even if that authority encompasses criminal or fraudulent activity. For
present purposes, this Article accepts that a lawyer may lawfully do so,
even if doing so subtly (or not-so-subtly) encourages a client to
participate in a crime or fraud.49 Indeed, that proposition is not terribly
controversial and is reasonably well accepted, particularly given the
language in Model Rule 1.2(d) inviting a lawyer to engage in that activity,
even if the conduct discussed qualifies as criminal or fraudulent.so
However, confounding questions arise regarding when a lawyer has
violated Rule 1.2(d) by so actively "counseling" a client about a crime or
fraud that the lawyer encourages and therefore assists the client in that
activity."' Even more interesting questions arise about the morality-in
contrast to the lawfulness-of a lawyer's accepting the invitation of the
rule to advise a client about the limits of the law, and how lawyers ought
to respond to those moral tensions.5 2
But this Article examines a question that is simpler, more direct, and
equally interesting. It imagines a lawyer not merely counseling a client
about certain actions but proceeding to assist the client in achieving
unlawful goals by creating documents, developing strategies, advocating
on the client's behalf, and so forth-the activities that, if the assisted
conduct were criminal or fraudulent, would subject the attorney to
discipline.53 The three stories above offer opportunities for that active
49. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6, at 586-88.
50. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2014) ("[A] lawyer
may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may
counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or
application of the law.").
51. See Hazard, supra note 3, at 674-75; Newman, supra note 5, at 290-91; Pepper,
Counseling, supra note 5, at 1588-89.
52. See, e.g., David Luban, Asking the Right Questions, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 839, 843 (1999);
Tanina Rostain, Pockets ofProfessionalism, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1475, 1486 (2002).
53. It is not uncommon to encounter attorney discipline for such participation. See, e.g., In
re McCarty, 75 A.3d 589, 597-98 (Vt 2013) (discussing term suspension for attorney who created
false documents to obtain an unlawful eviction); In re Poff, 714 S.E.2d 313, 322 (S.C. 2011)
(discussing term suspension for aiding a client who reported falsely about her income to obtain
Medicaid); In re Hanserd, 26 Mass. Att'y Disc. Rep. 229 (2010) (discussing term suspension for
assisting in real estate transactions in which the parties misrepresented the facts of the deals); In
re Alberino, 27 Mass. Att'y Disc. Rep. 1 (2011) (discussing term suspension for participating in
a foreclosure rescue scheme in which the clients signed false documents). For an insightful
discussion of the meaning of the term "assisting," see Sam Kamin & Eli Wald, Marijuana
Lawyers: Outlaws or Crusaders?, 91 OR. L. REv. 869, 901-02 (2013).
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assistance. This Article will examine whether the lawyers in question
"may" participate actively in that wrongdoing.
C. The Lessons from the Model Rules
We start with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as the baseline
substantive law governing lawyers. If the Rules prohibit Shin's assistance
in the solicitation efforts, that pretty much ends the discussion. If the
Rules do not prohibit Shin's participation in his client's unlawful activity,
then we need to explore whether some other law beyond the rules applies
to limit the lawyer's actions.54
A review of the Model Rules provisions, including applicable
Comments, demonstrates that the ABA, which drafted the rules, and
those states that adopted the rules most likely do not prohibit a lawyer
like Shin from assisting with AMJ's unlawful conduct. We see, however,
that this conclusion is not without ambiguity. This inquiry starts, sensibly,
with Rule 1.2(d).
1. The Rule 1.2(d) Language and History
The language of Rule 1.2(d) and its historical development permit us
to tease out the apparent message therein that lawyers have some liberty
to aid clients in lawbreaking55 so long as the aid does not involve a crime
or fraud.
a. The Rule's Language
Model Rule 1.2(d) states:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal conse uences
of any proposed course of conduct with a client ....
This language does not prohibit counseling about or assisting with
client conduct that is unlawful but not criminal or fraudulent. The
Comments to Rule 1.2 do not refer at all to the lawyer's responsibilities
when the prospect of assistance with other unlawful activity arises.5 7 One
indirect reference to the question explored here appears in Comment [10]:
54. It is a common refrain within legal ethics circles, even if it might at times get overlooked
by the practicing bar, that substantive law beyond the ethics rules can and does constrain lawyer
conduct. See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 112-
14 (5th ed. 2010).
55. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2014).
56. Id.
57. See id. Comments 9 through 13 appear under the heading of "Criminal, Fraudulent and
Prohibited Transactions," and all of those comments refer to criminal or fraudulent activity.
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"A lawyer may not continue assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer
originally supposed was legally proper but then discovers is criminal or
fraudulent." 8 The drafters' choice to limit the second category of
improper conduct is telling and supports the inference that arises from the
straightforward reading of Rule 1.2(d).
b. The Rule's Development
The development of the text of Rule 1.2(d) during the crafting of the
original Model Rules leading up to their adoption in 1983 supports the
plain-language reading of the Rule. Before 1983, the ABA promulgated,
and all of the states relied on, the predecessor Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.5 9 The Model Code's treatment of the assistance question
appeared in Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(7), which read,
In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall
not ... [c]ounsel or assist his client in conduct that the
lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent.6 0
The Code limited a lawyer's counseling and assisting a client to
activity that was not illegal, a seemingly broader restriction than that
included in Rule 1.2(d). In its adoption of the Model Rules, the ABA
replaced the adjective "illegal" with "criminal," perhaps to clarify the
meaning of the former, or perhaps to provide lawyers with more
discretion than the Code provided. The difference does not matter today.
Whether the Code covered less assistance than it seemed to, or whether
the drafters intended to limit the scope of the restriction going forward,
the result is clear. Applying the well-accepted interpretational rule
expressio unius est exclusio alterius,6 1 the fair reading of Rule 1.2(d) is
that it does not apply to activity that is neither criminal 62 nor fraudulent. 63
58. Id. at cmt. 10 (emphasis added).
59. See DEBORAH L. RHODE ET AL., LEGAL ETHIcs 85-86 (7th ed. 2016) (explaining all
states but California adopted the Model Code, and California established comparable provisions);
WOLFRAM, supra note 8, at 56-57 (explaining by 1974 all states but California had adopted the
1969 Model Code).
60. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (AM. BAR ASS'N 1969)
(emphasis added).
61. See Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009);
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168
(1993) (applying the interpretive canon).
62. The Model Penal Code defines a crime as "an offense" defined by statute, "for which
the sentence of [death or of] imprisonment is authorized. Crimes are classified as felonies,
misdemeanors or petty misdemeanors." MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2016).
63. "Fraud" is defined by the Model Rules as "conduct that is fraudulent under the
substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive." MODEL
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Much unlawful conduct fits within that universe.6
The legislative history of the Kutak Commission's development of
Rule 1.2(d) adds whatever further support might be needed for this
conclusion. The Commission's 1980 discussion draft of the Model Rules
included, as then-Rule 4.3, an express limit on lawyer participation in
contract drafting and negotiation that employed terms that did not satisfy
the requirements of the law:
A lawyer shall not conclude an agreement, or assist a client
in concluding an agreement, that the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know is illegal, contains legally
prohibited terms, would work a fraud, or would be held to be
unconscionable as a matter of law. 6 5
The Kutak Commission eliminated that provision in its next draft of
the Rules. In 1982, as the Kutak Commission refined the language of Rule
1.2(d), the "Final Draft" of the rule included language that would have
had some relevance to the inquiry here:
A lawyer shall not counsel or assist a client in conduct that
the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is criminal or
fraudulent, or in the preparation of a written instrument
containing terms the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know are legally prohibited . . . , but a lawyer may counsel
or assist a client in a good faith effort to determine the
validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.6 6
The phrase "or in the preparation of a written instrument containing
terms the lawyer knows or reasonably should know are legally"
prohibited" did not appear in the version of Rule 1.2(d) put forward by
the Commission. At the ABA Midyear Meeting in 1983, the International
Association of Insurance Counsel (JAIC) proposed an amendment to the
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.0(d) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2014). The RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
describes the elements of common-law fraud as:
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or
law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in reliance
upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused to
him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
64. "Kinds of law cover a wide spectrum, and hence, do kinds of potential violations: from
breach of contract, through negligence, to civil regulatory matters, on to criminal violation."
Pepper, supra note 28, at 333; see also Pierce, supra note 9, at 747 (discussing the ways in which
illegal can include conduct not defined as criminal).
65. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.3 (AM. BAR Ass'N, Discussion Draft 1980).
66. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR Ass'N, Final Draft 1982).
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Commission's proposal, reading as follows:
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel or assist a client in conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal, or fraudulent, or otherwise
intentionally tort[i/ous, or in the preparation of a written
instrument containing terms the lawyer knows are expressly
prohibited by law or unenforceable, but a lawyer may
counsel or assist a client in a good faith effort to determine
the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.6 7
The IAIC argued that 'criminal or fraudulent' conduct is too
narrow .... [N]o lawyer should be permitted to counsel or assist in any
intentional tort." 6 8 The House of Delegates rejected that amendment by a
voice vote. 6 9 At that same meeting, the ABA Section on General Practice
proposed to add a new rule, Rule 4.2(a), expressing a prohibition on
"knowingly encouraging a client to engage in illegal conduct, except in a
good faith effort to test the validity or scope of the law." 7 0 The Section
withdrew its proposal before any vote on it. 7 1
This legislative history shows that the Kutak Commission, later
supported by the ABA House of Delegates, communicated that a lawyer
may prepare agreements with prohibited terms, assist with tortious acts,
and otherwise aid in illegality other than crimes or frauds.
c. The Rule's Interpretation and Application
There is surprisingly little interpretive commentary on the meaning of
the "negative pregnant" 72 within Rule 1.2(d). The ABA has never
67. CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS'N, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982-2013, at 49 (Art
Garwin ed., 2013) (emphasis added) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. The text uses the term
"tortuous" instead of "tortious," no doubt as a misprint. See 108 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 289, 294
(1983).
68. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 67, at 50.
69. Id. at 49.
70. Id. at 50.
71. Id.
72. The "negative pregnant" is a rule of statutory construction articulated by the Supreme
Court. See Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 67 (1995) ("[U]nder the rule... an express statutory
requirement [in one section of a statute], contrasted with statutory silence [in another section],
shows an intent to confine the requirement to the specified instance."). It is accepted to apply
statutory construction principles to the rules of professional conduct See ABA Comm'n on Ethics
and Prof'1 Responsibility, Informal Op. 89-1530 (1989); ABA Comm'n on Ethics and Prof I
Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995) (dissent of Ralph G. Elliot); David B. Isbell &
Lucantonio N. Salvi, Ethical Responsibility of Lawyers for Deception by Undercover
Investigators and Discrimination Testers: An Analysis of the Provisions Prohibiting
Misrepresentation Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 791,
816-18 (1995).
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declared in its publications that Rule 1.2(d) permits lawyers to engage
actively in noncriminal and nonfraudulent wrongdoing. The Comments
to Rule 1.2(d) do not address what one observer has termed the "negative
inference" 73 of the Rule's choice of language. The Annotated Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, produced by the ABA's Center for
Professional Responsibility, similarly skirts the question entirely,
focusing only on the importance of avoiding assistance with crimes and
frauds and never mentioning the rule's applicability to other
wrongdoing.74 An earlier version of the Annotated Model Rules included
the statement that "[a] lawyer may never further a client's lawful
objectives through unlawful means," 75 but later editions of the text
omitted that advice, which is inconsistent with the Rule 1.2(d) message. 76
Case law on the question is effectively nonexistent.77 One court
opinion has implied that the application of Rule 1.2(d) only to its
identified forms of illegality is appropriate. In In re Scionti,78 a lawyer
faced disciplinary charges based on Rule 1.2(d) after advising his client-
to violate a custody and visitation order.79 The lawyer and his client
feared for the safety of the child.so In his defense, the lawyer argued that
"a finding of violation of [Indiana Rule] 1.2(d) is unwarranted because
the offense Respondent's client committed derived from a civil action,
73. See Pierce, supra note 9, at 854.
74. See ELLEN J. BENNETT ET. AL., AM. BAR Ass'N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 31-47 (8th ed. 2015). That treatise does, however, include the following
oblique reference in its discussion of Rule 1.2(d): "A lawyer's assistance in unlawful conduct is
not excused by a failure to inquire into the client's objectives." Id. at 46 (emphasis added). There
is no reason to believe that the treatise editors' employment of that more expansive phrase is
intended to communicate anything substantive from the ABA beyond the plain language of the
rule itself.
75. CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR Ass'N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 23 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter ANNOTATED MODEL RULES].
76. Compare id., with BENNETT ET AL., supra note 74, at 31-47.
77. The research for this Article has found no discipline based on the Model Rule version
of Rule 1.2(d) not involving crime or fraud. The only cases that discipline a lawyer for violation
of Rule 1.2(d) after counseling or assisting in other unlawful conduct appear in a state that retained
the term "illegal" in its version of the rule. See In re Rosen, 35 A.3d 1196, 1197-98 (N.J. 2012)
(discipline for assistance with violation of a regulatory requirement that appears not to qualify as
a crime or fraud, although termed "deceptive" by the court). Even in those states continuing with
the "illegal" ban, discipline almost universally follows assistance with crimes or frauds. See, e.g.,
Trumbull Cty. Bar Ass'n. v. Roland, 63 N.E.3d 1200, 1202 (Ohio 2016) (concealing assets in a
divorce proceeding); In re Lowell, 784 N.Y.S.2d 69, 72 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (discussing
assistance with fraud); In re Goldberg, 520 A.2d 1147, 1147 (N.J. 1987) (discussing conviction
of aiding drug distribution).
78. 630 N.E.2d 1358 (Ind. 1994).
79. Id. at 1358-59.
80. Id. at 1361.
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and therefore a criminal violation was unforeseeable by Respondent."81
The court rejected that defense because the criminal implications of the
violation were foreseeable. 82
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers is only
slightly more forthcoming. The Restatement reports that a lawyer may
assist a client with a breach of contract without violating the duties
captured by Rule 1.2(d).8 3 That conclusion is consistent with several other
authorities asserting that breach of contract ought not to be considered
activity barred by Rule 1.2(d), or even "illegal" for purposes of the
broader Code language. 4 Beyond that example of unlawfulness, 85 the
Restatement says nothing about whether a lawyer may assist a client with
other unlawful activity, such as regulatory violations or intentional
torts.86
The few scholars who addressed the topic directly have read Rule
1.2(d) to mean what it says, as authorizing (or at least not prohibiting)
assistance with a wide array of unlawful activity. For example, Professor
Carl Pierce writes,
[O]ne of the most striking features of Rule 1.2(d) is the
extent to which it does not prohibit a lawyer from counseling
81. Id. at 1360.
82. Id.
83. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 57 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
84. See, e.g., Alaska Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 88-2 (1988) (explaining breach of contract (and
the attorney's concealment of breach of contract) would not violate either DR 7-102(A)(7) or Rule
1.2(d)); Hazard, supra note 3, at 674-75 ("The term 'illegality' in ordinary legal parlance does
not embrace breach of contract . . . ."); Lewis Tesser & Timothy Nolen, "Illegal" Conduct Under
Rule 1.2: When Does Advice to a Client Violate an Attorney's Ethical Obligations?, N.Y LEGAL
ETHICS REP. (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.newyorklegalethics.com/illegal-conduct-under-rule-1-2-
when-does-advice-to-a-client-violate-an-attorneys-ethical-obligations/.
85. See Pierce, supra note 9, at 901-04 (addressing whether the "unlawful" term ought to
apply to that activity).
86. The final adopted Restatement language is more consistent with Rule 1.2(d) than its
preliminary draft. The American Law Institute's 1992 draft stated, in a question-begging way,
that "[a] lawyer must not assist the client when doing so would incur liability on the part of the
lawyer." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 192 (Preliminary Draft No.
8, 1992). Comment i to that section included the following interpretive guidance:
The fact that a client intends to commit criminal or otherwise illegal acts does
not by itself entail that a lawyer must not provide legal advice to the client. A
lawyer may provide such advice for the purpose of indicating to the client the
illegal nature of the activity. A lawyer must not, however, provide such
assistance with the purpose of criminally or otherwise assisting the client in the
activity.
Id. § 192 cmt. i.
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or assisting a client to engage in a wide variety of misconduct
for which the client will be subject to legal liability.
Other writers have offered similar observations,88 including, as noted
in the Introduction, Professor Charles Wolfram, the Chief Reporter for
the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. 8 9 Professor
Stephen Pepper has observed that because "violations of the [National
Labor Relations Act] are neither criminal nor fraudulent[,] [u]nder [DR]
7-101(A)(7) the lawyer's conduct [in assisting such violations] appears
to be prohibited; under [Rule] 1.2(d) it appears to be clearly protected."9 0
Professor Martin Malin has applied Rule 1.2(d) to a lawyer's inclusion in
an employment agreement an arbitration term that violates Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, and concludes that, because the provision would
constitute neither a crime nor a fraud, "[t]he Model Rules clearly do not
prohibit the lawyer from drafting the arbitration agreement." 91
As noted above, no lawyer has been disciplined under the Model
Rules version of Rule 1.2(d) for misconduct that did not involve a crime
or a fraud.9 2 That comes as no surprise, of course; it would violate
87. Pierce, supra note 9, at 891. Pierce adds, "There are numerous intentional torts other
than fraudulent misrepresentation that lawyers are not currently prohibited from encouraging or
assisting." Id. at 899.
88. See Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 9, at 68 ("[W]e believe it is imperative that the
prohibition contained in Model Rule 1.2(d) be expanded to reach all client conduct that would
violate a statute or regulation, whether or not that conduct is considered criminal, given that these
enactments are the clearest legal pronouncements of societal norms. We also believe that the rule's
restriction on lawyer assistance should reach intentional client conduct that violates common law
duties as well."); Michael C. Durst, The Tax Lawyer's Professional Responsibility, 39 FLA. L.
REv. 1027, 1074 (1987) (applying that distinction to tax practice); Henry J. Lischer, Jr.,
Professional Responsibility Issues Associated with Asset Protection Trusts, 39 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 561, 622 (2004) (applying that distinction to estate planning practice); Tesser & Nolen,
supra note 84, at 2 ("The ABA Rule ... appears to apply only to criminal conduct, not civil
wrongs.").
89. See WOLFRAM, supra note 8, at 704-05.
90. Pepper, Counseling, supra note 5, at 1592-93.
91. Malin, supra note 9, at 817. Malin also asserts that, while the provision would "literally"
violate the former Model Code provision, DR 7-102(A)(7), "the Code was never interpreted to
apply to conduct that was neither criminal nor fraudulent." Id.
92. Many reported attorney disciplinary matters cite the Model Rules version of Rule 1.2(d)
as a basis for discipline, but always involve criminal or fraudulent activity. On occasion, discipline
has been imposed, using Rule 1.2(d), for violation of a court order. See, e.g., In re Munroe, 26
Mass. Att'y Disc. R. 385, 388 (2010) ("by assisting his clients in violating a court order, the
respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(d)"); id (interpreting Massachusetts's version of Rule
1.2(d), which is identical to the Model Rule); In re Holden, 982 P.2d 399, 399 (Kan. 1999)
(interpreting Kansas's version of Rule 1.2(d)); Matthew A. Smith, Note, Advice and Complicity,
60 DuKE L.J. 499, 503 (2010). That treatment should apply only when the court order violation
itself constitutes a crime. Typically, violation of a court order would lead to discipline based upon
a different Rule of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.4 (c) or 8.4(c). See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v.
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fundamental fairness and the due process rights of a lawyer-respondent
to discipline her for activity not identified in the disciplinary rules.93
No observer since the Model Rules were adopted by the ABA in 1983
has argued directly that Rule 1.2(d) ought to be read to cover all illegal
or unlawful client activity. One who comes close is Professor W. Bradley
Wendel. Wendel agrees that Rule 1.2(d) does not expressly bar a lawyer
from assisting with all unlawful conduct, but warns that "[t]his language
may tempt lawyers to think they can advise clients to engage in conduct
that is not defined as a crime or fraud under the law of the relevant
jurisdiction."9 4 He then argues that lawyers would be mistaken in that
belief, because of the power of the other law, including malpractice
exposure, that prohibits such assistance. 95 Wendel may be correct,
although, as the discussion below shows, his assertion is probably not
sustainable. 9 6
Therefore, considered in light of its plain language and history, Rule
1.2(d) does communicate to lawyers precisely what Wendel worries
about: that "they can advise clients to engage in conduct that is not
defined as a crime or fraud under the law of the relevant jurisdiction." 9 7
But the Rule ought not be read entirely in isolation. Other components of
the Model Rules muddy the message in various ways, sometimes
supportively, other times not so much. This Article now considers those
other provisions.
2. Rules 1.2(a) and 1.3
The 1983 Rules adoption included another change from the
predecessor Code that has some relevance to this inquiry. The 1969
Model Code included a provision stating that "[a] lawyer shall not
intentionally .. . fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through
reasonably available means permitted by law."9 8 The Kutak Commission
chose not to include that duty within the Model Rules, and no future Rules
revision added it. Two states have opted to maintain that language within
Rohrer, 919 N.E.2d 180, 183 (Ohio 2009); In re Disciplinary Action Against Miley, 486 N.W.2d
759, 760 (Minn. 1992).
93. Lawyers are entitled to due process protection in disciplinary proceedings. See Ex Parte
Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 530 (1824); In re Barach, 540 F.3d 82, 85 (1st Cir. 2008); Mark J.
Fucile, Giving Lawyers Their Due: Due Process Defenses in Disciplinary Proceedings, 20 PROF.
LAW. 28, 28 (2011).
94. See WENDEL, supra note 1, at 264.
95. Id. (citing FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 512 U.S.
79 (1994), af'd in relevant respects on remand, 61 F.3d 17 (9th Cir. 1995)).
96. See infra text accompanying notes 174-83.
97. WENDEL, supra note 1, at 264.
98. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1) (AM. BAR Ass'N 1969)
(emphasis added).
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their version of Rule 1.2(a),9 9 but the majority have not. 00 A Comment
to Model Rule 1.3 does refer to the lawyer's duty to "take whatever lawful
and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or
endeavor."101 In either iteration of that sentiment, the ABA's comment
does not undercut Rule 1.2(d). In describing the duty of the lawyer to
pursue all lawful measures available to achieve a client's interests, the
provision begs the question we explore here: whether a lawyer may also,
not as a duty but as a choice, assist with some unlawful activity in the
pursuit of those same ends.
3. Rule 1.16(a)(1)
One provision within the Model Rules does cast some doubt upon the
consistent reading of Rule 1.2(d) described just above. Rule 1.16(a)(1)
reads as follows:
[A] lawyer shall not represent a client or, where
representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the
representation of a client if:
(1) the representation will result in violation of the rules
of professional conduct or other law... .102
This language communicates a prohibition on lawyer assistance of
client conduct that will result in a violation of any "other law," whether
that other law is considered criminal or fraudulent. This broader language
than that found in Rule 1.2(d) appears to impose the same ban that the
Model Code provided and the Rules drafters rejected. No explanation
appears within the ABA to account for this inconsistency. The question
to be explored here is how a practicing lawyer ought to understand Rule
1.2(d) in light of Rule 1.16(a)(1). For instance, if Jonathan Shin
contemplates assisting his client, AMJ, in its unlawful charitable
solicitation activity, is he barred from doing so?
No reliable interpretation of the meaning of this provision exists.
Writers on occasion cite to the language of Rule 1.16(a)(1) when
asserting that a lawyer may not aid a client in illegal or unlawful actions,
but never in a directed, analytic fashion, with a careful comparison to
Rule 1.2(d).' 03 The authorities who interpret Rule 1.2(d) as authorizing
99. MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a); MICH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a).
100. See STEPHEN GILLERS ET AL., REGULATION OF LAWYERS, STATUTES AND STANDARDS
(2014) (comparing state versions of Rule 1.2(a)).
101. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. I (AM. BAR Ass'N 2014) (emphasis
added).
102. Id. r. 1.16(a)(1) (emphasis added).
103. See, e.g., Jon Bauer, Buying Witness Silence: Evidence-Suppressing Settlements and
Lawyers' Ethics, 87 OR. L. REv. 481, 497 (2008) ("[Tlhe lawyer must not counsel or assist the
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assistance with nonfraudulent and noncriminal conduct typically do not
account for Rule 1.16(a)(1) in their analysis.104 In his treatise on the
Model Rules, for example, Wolfram, who concludes that Rule 1.2(d) does
"not limit a lawyer's advice, even encouragement, to a client about
unlawful acts so long as the acts are not criminal or fraudulent," 0 5
separately writes to observe that Rule 1.16(a)(1) would prohibit a lawyer
from proceeding in unlawful conduct with "only a fine as the penalty for
noncompliance."1 06
There are three possible ways to understand the juxtaposition of Rule
1.2(d)'s language with Rule 1.16(a)'s language. The first is that the latter
provision trumps the former and corrects the implication that Rule 1.2(d)
does not cover all unlawful activity. The second is the converse of the
first-that Rule 1.16(a)(1)'s general reference to "other law" is a remnant
of some prior understanding without undercutting the more deliberative
and specific provision of Rule 1.2(d). A third possibility exists-that Rule
1.1 6(a)(1) refers to some activity other than assisting a client, such as the
lawyer's own conduct and its direct illegality. No authority or legislative
history is available to assist us in discerning with full confidence which
client in 'conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent,' or take actions on behalf of the
client that 'will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law."') (citing
Rules 1.2(d) and 1.16(a)(1)); Kevin H. Michels, Lawyer Independence: From Ideal to Viable
Legal Standard, 61 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 85, 136 n.266 (2010) (the Rules "prohibit[] counsel
from assisting a client transaction that counsel knows is wrongful") (citing Rule 1.16(a)(1));
Morrison, supra note 17, at 304 (the Model Rules "prevent an attorney from giving legal services
to clients who are going to engage in unlawful behavior with the attorney as their accomplice")
(citing the Rule); Paula Schaefer, Overcoming Noneconomic Barriers to Loyal Disclosure, 44
AM. Bus. L.J. 417, 421 n. 14 (2007) ("[A]n attorney cannot participate in a client's fraud and must
withdraw from the representation if continuing will assist the client in illegal conduct") (citing the
Rule); Zacharias, Lawyers as Gatekeepers, supra note 7, at 1395-96 (lawyers "may not participate
in or assist illegal conduct") (citing the Rule).
104. See, e.g., Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 9, at 15-16; Malin, supra note 9, at 817;
Pepper, Counseling, supra note 5, at 1587; Pierce, supra note 9, at 854-58.
105. WOLFRAM, supra note 8, at 704.
106. Id. at 552 n.88. Here is Wolfram's example:
Suppose that a lawyer is asked by a client who is a foreign country to engage in
some emergency work. Assume that applicable law requires the lawyer to
register as the agent of a foreign country before undertaking any legal work
with-we will assume, probably inaccurately-only a fine as a penalty for
noncompliance. Undertaking the work without registering first seems to violate
the Model Rules (MR 1.16(a)(1)) but not the Code.
Id. Wolfram's conclusion that the Code would not be violated rests not on DR 7-102(A)(7),
discussed above, but on DR 2-110(B), requiring withdrawal if the representation will result in the
lawyer's violating the Code, but not "other law," as the Model Rules provide. Id.
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of the three alternatives is most reliable,1 07 but the best reading would
conclude that the second alternative is the safest bet.
There are two reasons to reject the first hypothesis-that the general
Rule 1.16 language overrules the more specific Rule 1.2 language. The
first is the ordinary interpretive tool holding that a more specific
provision carries more weight than a more general one. 08 The history
explored above shows much deliberation within the ABA, and explicit
choices made among identified alternative provisions, to arrive at the
terms of Rule 1.2(d), with a perhaps surprising result, and one that
represented a change in policy from the rule's predecessor. 109 By contrast,
no such deliberation or debate appears in any historical account of the
development of Rule 1.16(a)(1)."o The second reason to reject that
hypothesis is grounded in the ABA's treatment of the language in
question within Rule 1.16. Notwithstanding the text of the Rule, the
Comment addressing that provision states that "[a] lawyer ordinarily
must decline or withdraw from representation if the client demands that
the lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates the Rules of
Professional Conduct or other law.""' The Comment reaffirms the
broader coverage ("illegal," "other law") but adds an unexplained
qualifier. The Annotated Model Rules treatment backs off even more. In
explaining the reach of Rule 1.16(a)(1), the Center for Professional
Responsibility hedges in a way that seemingly affirms the Rule 1.2(d)
message. Under the heading "Assisting Client Misconduct," the resource
advises its readers as follows: "A lawyer is required to withdraw if the
lawyer knows continued representation will result in assisting a client to
commit a criminal or fraudulent act." 1 2 The Annotated Model Rules thus'
appears to interpret Rule 1.16(a)(1) in harmony with Rule 1.2(d),
notwithstanding the apparent broader coverage of the former rule itself.
The authors could have easily written, "assisting a client to commit a
107. The sources that aid in our understanding of the development of the final adopted
language of Rule 1.2(d) do not offer any similar legislative history of the basis for the language
in Rule 1.16(a). See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 67; 108 A.B.A. ANN. REP., supra note 67.
108. This is a common technique in statutory interpretation, known as "generalia specialibus
non derogant," or "general things do not derogate from special things." See Generalia Specialibus
Non Derogant, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 538-52 (2011); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'1 Responsibility,
Formal Op. 250 (1943) (applying that principle to interpretation of the ethics rules); Art Hinshaw
& Jess K. Alberts, Doing the Right Thing: An Empirical Study ofAttorney Negotiation Ethics, 16
HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 95, 107 (2011) (applying that test to an interpretation of a Model Rule).
109. See supra text accompanying note 108.
110. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 67, at 365-81; 108 A.B.A. ANN. REP., supra note
67, at 323-25.
111. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.16 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2014).
112. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra note 75.
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criminal or fraudulent act or to violate some other law," in order to be
faithful to the provision about which they write. However, the authors
chose not to do so. In addition, each of the cases used to illustrate the
provision involves a lawyer who assisted a client or engaged in conduct
that was either criminal, fraudulent, or in violation of a court order."13
The second hypothesis, therefore, earns support for this analysis. This
theory suggests that the Model Rules drafters included the Rule 1.16
language more generally to refer to some forms of illegality (for instance,
crime and fraud) without intending to cover all illegality-inartful,
perhaps, but not a dramatic error in judgment. That reading, like the
treatment by the Center for Professional Responsibility, preserves the
meaning of Rule 1.2(d) without sacrificing much in the Rule 1.16 realm.
No authority or commentator has made this argument, but then again, no
authority or commentator has addressed directly the inconsistency at
issue here.
Then there is the third hypothesis-that the "other law" term used by
Rule 1.16(a)(1) does not refer to assistance with the client's illegality but
rather a more direct application to the law that applies to the lawyer. The
argument looks like this: Lawyers are allowed to assist clients in their
wrongdoing so long as the client's wrongdoing is not criminal,
fraudulent, or in violation of a court order. But if the representation of the
client requires the lawyer to break the law, the lawyer may not continue
with the representation and must withdraw. This admittedly cramped
interpretation would help account for the Professor Wolfram story
encountered above, where he concluded that a lawyer would be mandated
to withdraw under Rule 1.16, but not under the Model Code, if
proceeding with the legal work left the lawyer exposed to a penalty."14
Applying the respective Model Code and Model Rules mandatory
withdrawal provisions, Wolfram concluded that the language in the 1983
rule prohibiting a lawyer from continuing with work that violated "other
law" would require withdrawal, while the Code language, referring only
to violations of the professional rules, would not.'ts Because Wolfram
later concludes that Rule 1.2(d) does not bar the lawyer from assisting
with noncriminal or nonfraudulent client misconduct,' 16 his interpretation
of Rule 1.16(a)(1) to bar lawyer participation requires some justification,
and this hypothesis appears to be the only one available.
113. Id. As described above, violation of a court order is a category of lawbreaking that the
Model Rules forbid, either through an expansive reading of Rule 1.2(d) or, more aptly, through
the application of Model Rule 8.4(c). See supra text accompanying note 75.
114. See WOLFRAM, supra note 8, at 552 n.88; supra text accompanying note 105.
115. See WOLFRAM, supra note 8, at 552 n.88.
116. Id. at 704-05.
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The problem with this hypothesis is that it has little connection to the
actual language of Rule 1.16(a)(1). The rule requires withdrawal' 1 7 when
"the representation will result in violation of [some] other law,"118 while
the hypothesis would only address the lawyer's risk of lawbreaking, not
the client's. No authority, either from the ABA or from scholars, has ever
read the Rule 1.16(a)(1) provision in this way. For our purposes,
therefore, we should accept that the third hypothesis is not a credible one.
The most sensible conclusion, then, is that Rule 1.2(d) remains intact,
unaffected by Rule 1.16(a)(1)'s inconsistent language. The enforcement
of Rule 1.16(a)(1) within the state disciplinary reports supports that
conclusion. Research uncovers scores of discipline reports in which Rule
1.16(a)(1) serves as the basis for attorney discipline. The reports reflect
discipline imposed under Rule 1.16(a) consistent with Rule 1.2(d). Every
available instance of misconduct leading to discipline for a failure to
withdraw involved the lawyer's encountering or participating in a crime,
fraud, or violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.11 9 The rule has
never served as the basis for discipline for violation of some "other law"
beyond those categories.120 The most common reason for a court to rely
on Rule 1.16(a)(1), rather than (or along with) Rule 1.2(d), is for a
developed conflict of interest requiring the attorney's withdrawal. 12 1 The
next most common fact pattern involves a lawyer's remaining in some
117. It also requires refusal to commence representation in the circumstances discussed, but
the questions explored here arise almost inevitably within an ongoing engagement. See MODEL
RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUcr r. 1.16(a) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2014) (stating that "a lawyer shall not
represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation
of a client if' the listed circumstances arise).
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. See, e.g., In re Ford, 98 So. 3d 269, 272 (La. 2012); In re Edwardson, 647 N.W.2d 126,
127 (N.D. 2002); In re Drayton, 597 S.E.2d 791, 793 (S.C. 2004).
120. One reported discipline opinion relying upon a violation of Rule 1.16(a)(1) implies that
the lawyer's suspension from practice was justified by, among other reasons, the lawyer's having
failed to comply with a state regulation governing real estate transactions. See Ky. Bar Ass'n v.
Katz, 317 S.W.3d 592, 594 (Ky. 2010) (describing "other law" as "specifically, in violation of
Delaware interpretive guidelines regarding residential real estate transactions"). The opinion reads
as if some "other law," other than a crime, fraud, or breach of professional rules, served as the
trigger for the Rule 1.16(a)(1) violation. That implication is not supported by the facts, however.
The Kentucky discipline was reciprocal, after Delaware had suspended the attorney for
misconduct occurring in Delaware. See In re Katz, 981 A.2d 1133, 1150 (Del. 2009). The
reference to Rule 1.16(a)(1) in the Delaware disciplinary report did not rely on some noncriminal
Delaware regulation, which the Kentucky opinion implies, but instead to a special Delaware
interpretation of Rule 1.16 requiring lawyers in real estate transactions to avoid certain conflicts
of interest. See id. at 1141-42. The lawyer in question also engaged in multiple conflicts of interest
in violation of Delaware's Rule 1.7. Id. at 1140-41.
121. See, e.g., Att'y Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Zhang, 100 A.3d 1112, 1132 (Md. 2013);
In re Munden, 559 S.E.2d 589, 590 (S.C. 2002); In re Hoffman 700 N.E.2d 1138, 1139 (Ind.
1998).
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representation after losing her right to practice law, usually because of an
administrative suspension.1 2 2 In almost all of the applications of Rule
1.16(a)(1), the discipline arose from the lawyer's failure to withdraw to
prevent a breach of the state's rules of professional conduct.1 2 3
4. Rule 8.4(e)
Rule 8.4(e), like Rule 1. 16(a)(1), undercuts the message within Rule
1.2(d) and its consistent interpretation. Rule 8.4(e) declares that "[i]t is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . (e) state or imply an ability
to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve
results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other
law."' 2 4 Rule 8.4(e)'s language presents another conundrum within the
structure of the Model Rules. If it is true, as so far it seems to be, that
Rule 1.2(d) permits a lawyer's assistance with some conduct that is
unlawful, Rule 8.4(e) appears to assert that the lawyer may not inform a
client (or anyone else) of that possibility. Consider how that language
might apply to Jonathan Shin's work for AMJ on its unauthorized
solicitation of funds.1 2 5 As the story has been crafted, AMJ's requests for
funds from donors are not permitted by the governing state guidelines,
but doing so is not criminal or fraudulent, as no AMJ constituent will
mislead any donor about any aspect of the requested financial
assistance.1 2 6 Rule 1.2(d) does not bar Shin's counseling Ehsan Rahman,
the AMJ executive director, to proceed with the requests for donations,
or his assistance with that activity. Rule 8.4(e) also does not prohibit
Shin's performing that work, at least not expressly. Rule 8.4(e) does,
though, appear to prohibit Shin from stating, or even implying, to
Rahman that he may perform that work, which would render his
counseling of AMJ about that topic virtually impossible.
122. See, e.g., In re Fazande, 23 So. 3d 247, 252 (La 2009); In re Swisher, 179 P.3d 412,
417 (Kan. 2008); In re Paulson, 216 P.3d 859, 872 (Or. 2009); State ex rel Okla. Bar Ass'n v.
Knight, 359 P.3d 1122, 1123 (Okla. 2015).
123. See, e.g., Att'y Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Bleecker, 994 A.2d 928, 943 (Md.
2010) (discussing violation of Rule 3.3); In re Dennis, 188 P.3d 1, 18 (Kan. 2008) (discussing
failure to comply with a court order in violation of Rules 3.2 and 8.4(d)); People v. Johnson, 35
P.3d 168, 171 (Colo. 1999) (discussing violation of Rules 1.8 and 8.4(a)).
124. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4(e) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2014) (emphasis added).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
126. The story used here assumes that the regulations bar any requests for donations by a
charitable organization, even if the organization makes clear that the deductibility of the donations
is contingent on a future determination by the IRS that the organization qualifies as a Section
501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization. See discussion supra note 42 and accompanying text; see also
Overview of Solicitation, MASS.Gov, http://www.mass.gov/ago/doing-business-in-
massachusetts/public-charities-or-not-for-profits/soliciting-funds/overview-of-solicitation.htm
(last visited Nov. 19, 2017).
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The language of Rule 8.4(e) was shifted by the Ethics 2000
Commission from its placement in the lawyer marketing rule, Model Rule
7.1, to its current placement in the lawyer misconduct rule. 1 2 7 Before the
Ethics 2000 revision, Rule 8.4(e) contained only the existing langage
about improper influence of a government agency or official.12' The
Commission intended the new placement of that language "to clarify that
the prohibition is not limited to statements made in connection with
marketing legal services."1 29 The Commission accompanied the move
with a new explanatory Comment, which reads: "Lawyers are subject to
discipline when they violate or attempt to violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do
so through the acts of another, as when they request or instruct an agent
to do so on the lawyer's behalf."l 3 0 The purpose of the new comment,
according to the Commission, was "to explain when a lawyer is subject
to discipline for violating or attempting to violate the Rules 'through the
acts of another."'
1 31
No published interpretation of Rule 8.4(e) has concluded that its
revised language was intended to expand the scope of Rule 1.2(d)'s
prohibitions, and research uncovers no case or disciplinary report in
which that interpretation of Rule 8.4(e) has been used. 13 2 The only
ambiguity within the rule is its inclusion of the phrase "other law."
Otherwise, it effectively states a truism-that a lawyer may not claim to
be able to employ means that violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct. 1 3 3 Both the new Comment and the Reporter's explanation for
127. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 67, at 860.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 861.
130. MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt n. I (AM. BAR Ass'N 2014).
131. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 67, at 861.
132. While attorneys on occasion have been disciplined for violation of a version of Model
Rule 8.4(e), none of the disciplinary reports shows conduct unrelated to claims of improper
influence of an official. See, e.g., State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Erickson, 29 P.3d 550, 554
(2001) (discussing implication of possible bribery); In re Smith, 991 N.E.2d 106, 109 (Ind. 2013)
(discussing claims in book of having connections); In re Anderson, 804 N.E.2d 1145, 1145 (Ind.
2004) (explaining prosecutor arrested for DUI claimed to have had influence); In re Howard, 912
S.W.2d 61, 63 (Mo. 1995) (arguing in court that the attorney had influence with superiors); In re
Shariati, 31 A.3d 81, 84 (D.C. 2011) (discussing charges based on implication that attorney could
influence officials). References to Rule 8.4(e) within ethics scholarship appear only in the context
of improper influence. See, e.g., Heidi Reamer Anderson, Allocating Influence, 2009 UTAH L.
REv. 683, 685; George M. Cohen, The Laws ofAgency Lawyering, 84 FORDHAM L. REv. 1963,
1966 (2016).
133. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKi, LEGAL ETHICS, THE LAWYER'S
DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 8.4-2(f) (2017-2018 ed.):
If a lawyer violates the Rules or other law, then Rule 8.4(a) applies.
However, under Rule 8.4(e), even if a lawyer does not violate the Rules or other
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the Comment confirm that the worry is a lawyer's violation of the rules.
Like with the suggested interpretation of Rule 1.16(a)(1) above,1 3 4 there
is too little evidence available to conclude that this Rule 8.4(e) should be
read to alter the plain language understanding of Rule 1.2(d).
5. Summary of the Model-Rules Review
This review of the Model Rules permits a reasonably confident, if far
from certain, conclusion that those professional guidelines do not prohibit
a lawyer from advising a client about, encouraging a client to engage in,
or assisting a client with unlawful actions that are not criminal or
fraudulent. The carefully chosen language of Rule 1.2(d) communicates
that message to members of the bar, and none of the other more restrictive
provisions has the clarity or force to trump Rule 1.2(d)'s plain language.
To state that the Rules do not prohibit such assistance or encouragement
is to state that the Rules allow the same. 13 5 And to state that the Rules
allow the same is to state that the positive-law allowance applies whether
the unlawful or illegal actions cause no harm or some harm. 3 6 The Rules
make no such distinction.1 3 7 If this analysis is sound, two implications
warrant further exploration. The first is the possibility that,
notwithstanding the Model Rules' permission to encourage or assist with
certain wrongdoing, 3 8 lawyers may not encourage or assist because of
some superseding "other law" applicable to them. The second (assuming
that the first implication is not dispositive and lawyers do retain some
discretion to assist in wrongdoing) is to discern the meaning of the ABA's
permission and the practice choices available to lawyers aiming to lead
an ethical professional life. This Article will examine each of these
implications in order.
law, but instead only brags to clients that she will do so to accomplish the client's
objectives, her statement is disciplinable under Rule 8.4(e).
Id. Therefore, according to this commentary, the lawyer's proposed actions must be themselves
in violation of the Rules or some law for this rule to apply.
134. See supra text accompanying note 107.
135. See Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 6, at 308.
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2014).
138. This Article uses the term "wrongdoing" to refer to unlawful or illegal conduct, but
advisedly so. It recognizes that some activity that might be considered "unlawful"-such as
breaching a contract-may not be considered "wrongful." As one court has written, "a breach of
contract is not considered wrongful activity in the sense that a tort or a crime is wrongful." Zapata
Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., 313 F.3d 385, 389 (7th Cir. 2002); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, topic 3, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (treating
remedies as a cost).
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D. The Availability of "Other Law" as a Supplement to Rule 1.2(d)
This Article next explores the limitations that "other law"-from
outside of the profession-imposes on lawyer assistance of client
wrongdoing. Perhaps the ban missing from the Model Rules arrives from
other doctrine or regulatory constraints.
1. The Relevance of Other Law
If the Model Rules do not prohibit-and as a consequence allow-the
kinds of assistance with wrongdoing just described, that reality may
matter very little if some equally effective "other law" accomplished the
same prohibition.1 39 If some authority applicable to lawyers specifically,
or to citizens generally, prohibits assistance with illegal conduct beyond
crimes and fraud, attorneys would effectively proceed as though the older
Model Code language prohibiting assistance with all "illegal" conduct
were still in place. It appears that such is not the case, however. While
some restrictions do exist in select contexts, no widely applicable
authority categorically prohibits a lawyer from assisting a client with
conduct that violates some statute or regulation or constitutes a civil tort
or breach of contract.
Before proceeding with this step of the analysis, we need to be clear
about the question to be addressed in this subpart. As a matter of
discipline and the authority of the relevant state supreme court's ethical
rules, the applicable Model Rule provisions control, even if it were true
that the lawyer risks some other, separate sanction for his assistance with
client wrongdoing. Put another way, it will matter to a practicing lawyer
whether the disciplinary authority bars a certain action, notwithstanding
any other implications of the action. For example, if we accept that Rule
1.2(d) does not prohibit a lawyer from assisting a client who engages in
intentionally tortious conduct, 14 0 a lawyer who does so might
nevertheless be found liable to pay damages to the injured party,1 4 1 even
if she might not be subject to discipline for her participation. Given this
Article's aim to understand the proper professional role responsibilities
139. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyers and Client Fraud: They Still Don't Get It, 6 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHIcs 701, 705-06 (1993) (noting the importance of "other law" to the realm of
lawyering activity).
140. See supra text accompanying note 67.
141. See Kurker v. Hill, 689N.E.2d 833, 836-37 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (ruling that minority
business owner's allegations against co-owners and lawyers supported claim of civil conspiracy);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (explaining that a person may
be liable in tort if he "knows that the . .. conduct [of another person] constitutes a breach of duty
and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself'); Douglas
R. Richmond, Lawyer Liabilityfor Aiding and Abetting Clients'Misconduct Under State Law, 75
DEF. COUNS. J. 130, 131 (2008); Eugene J. Schiltz, Civil Liabilityfor Aiding andAbetting: Should
Lawyers Be "Privileged" to Assist Their Clients' Wrongdoing?, 29 PACE L. REv. 75, 89 (2008).
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of lawyers, it matters little what risks those lawyers choose to accept. The
critical question is how the profession and its regulators address the
underlying attorney conduct. This Article treats a lawyer as having
discretion to perform some action if the bar chooses not to prohibit it,
even if some other consequences to the lawyer ensue. Yet some types of
assistance with wrongdoing expose the lawyer to no penalties or
sanctions at all, whether through the disciplinary system, exposure to civil
penalties, or administrative sanctions.
2. The Consequences Arising from Other Law
With that understanding, it is useful to summarize at least briefly the
risks a lawyer does accept in his decision to assist his clients in illegality
which the state bar authorities allow. That summary obviously excludes
considering criminal sanctions or civil liability for assistance with fraud,
since a lawyer has no permission from the bar to engage in either activity.
The remaining risks may be divided into two categories: civil damages
for aiding in client wrongdoing and regulatory sanctions for activity
declared off-limits by some federal, state, or local law. Let us consider
each in turn.
Civil liability: A lawyer may, without breaching her ethical duties as
established by the bar, engage in representational conduct on behalf of a
client for which she may be found liable and ordered to pay damages to
an injured party. A lawyer in some circumstances may face liability for
assisting in breaches of fiduciary dutyl4 2 or for aiding and abetting
torts. 14 3 In limited circumstances, a lawyer may be required to pay
damages for interference with contractual relationships. 1" A lawyer may
142. See Adena, Inc. v. Cohn, 162 F. Supp. 2d 351, 358 (E.D. Pa 2001) (finding against
lawyer for aiding in a partner's breach of fiduciary duty); Kenny v. Murphy, No. 08-P-996, 2010
WL 46376, at *3 (Mass. App. Ct. Jan. 8, 2010); Cacciola v. Nellhaus, 733 N.E.2d 133, 139-40
(Mass. App. Ct 2000); Christine L. Eid, Comment, Lawyer Liability for Aiding and Abetting
Squeeze-Outs, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1177, 1198 (2008); Katerina P. Lewinbuk, Let's Sue All
the Lawyers: The Rise of Claims Against Lawyers for Aiding and Abetting a Client's Breach of
Fiduciary Duty, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 135, 140 (2008); Brinkley Rowe, Note, See No Fiduciary, Hear
No Fiduciary: A Lawyer's Knowledge Within Aiding and Abetting Fiduciary Breach Claims, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 1389, at 1389, 1392 (2016); .
143. See Thomwood, Inc. v. Jenner & Block, 799 N.E.2d 756, 768 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)
("[W]e see no reason to impose a per se bar that prevents imposing liability upon attorneys who
knowingly and substantially assist their clients in causing another party's injury."); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). Considerable uncertainty exists regarding
whether lawyers may be held liable for assistance with a client's tortious conduct. See Kevin
Bennardo, The Tort of Aiding and Advising?: The Attorney Exception to Aiding and Abetting a
Breach ofFiduciary Duty, 84 N.D. L. REv. 85, 87, 90 (2008).
144. Ordinarily, a lawyer may not be held liable for interference with contractual
relationships when advising a client who chooses to breach a contract. See Macke Laundry Serv.
Ltd. P'ship v. Jetz Serv. Co., 931 S.W.2d 166, 181-82 (Mo. Ct App. 1996) (providing lawyers
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be found to qualify as a "primary" violator of Section 1Ob-5 of the
securities laws and ordered to pay damages to injured investors as the
result of work performed for clients, 1 4 5 or be held liable to investors for
negligent advice about a securities offering.14 6 In none of those settings
would a lawyer have necessarily violated her ethical duties within her
state, but she may pay a price for her conduct.
Regulatory sanctions: An agency or regulatory body could sanction a
lawyer for actions performed while representing a client even if those
actions do not violate Rule 1.2(d) because the conduct, while contrary to
an administrative regulation, is not criminal or fraudulent. Some
regulatory sanctions will qualify as crimes l4 and therefore would be
prohibited by Rule 1.2(d). Other sanctions, however, are administrative
and not covered by Rule 1.2(d). 148 It is true that another Model Rule
prohibits a lawyer's assisting some such administrative wrongdoing in an
adjudicative proceeding. Rule 3.4(c) states that "[a] lawyer shall
not ... (c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal
except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation
exists." 49 In an adjudicative proceeding before a state or federal agency,
the agency is a "tribunal" for purposes of Rule 3.4(c).150 A lawyer's
assistance to a client with conduct that violates agency rules would
therefore be prohibited by Rule 3.4(c) even if not by Rule 1.2(d). For
with a qualified privilege, when acting within the scope of attorney-client relationship, to assist a
client not to perform a contract); Eid, supra note 142, at 1217-18. But see Schott v. Glover, 440
N.E.2d 376, 380 (Ill. App. Ct 1982) (holding that a claim against a lawyer for tortious interference
with a contract must allege actual malice; "[s]uch allegations, however, would necessarily include
a desire to harm, which is independent of and unrelated to the attorney's desire to protect his*
client").
145. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994)
("Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank ... may be liable as a primary
violator under lOb-5 .. .. ") (referring to Rule 1Ob-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
17 C.F.R. § 240. 1Ob-5 (2017)) superseded by statute, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, as recognized in SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1280 (9th
Cir. 1996).
146. See FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd and
remanded, 512 U.S. 59 (1994).
147. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012) (listing criminal penalties for
violations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act); see also Greta Fails, The Boundary Between Zealous
Advocacy and Obstruction of Justice After Sarbanes-Oxley, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 397,
420 (2012) (discussing the criminal penalties under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act applicable to lawyer
activity on behalf of clients).
148. See Cohen, supra note 132, at 1984-85 (stating that some administrative violations may
not trigger Rule 1.2(d)).
149. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.4(c) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2014).
150. Id. r. 1.0(m) (defining "tribunal" to include an "administrative agency ... acting in an
adjudicative capacity"); see also Cohen, supra note 132, at 1966 ("When an agency 'act[s] in an
adjudicative capacity,' it is a 'tribunal' under Rule 1.0(m).").
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example, lawyers who practice before the Social Security Administration
(SSA) must comply with separate, agency-driven requirements when
representing claimants.1 5 ' Failure to honor those standards of conduct
may lead to sanctions, including suspension of the right to practice before
the SSA.1 5 2 The Securities and Exchange Commission1 5 3 and the United
States Patent and Trademark Office 5 4 may also discipline attorneys for
failure to meet their respective representational standards. That discipline
may include suspension of the right to practice before those agencies. 5 5
A lawyer might actively assist a client to violate an agency's
regulatory scheme but not in an adjudicative setting. That is the
arrangement captured by two of the three stories that began this Article-
the nonprofit solicitation tale"' and the trademark licensing tale.' 5 7 In
such a setting, the lawyer faces no agency or bar discipline sanctions for
assisting the client to proceed with actions that do not comply with the
regulatory requirements.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW LESSONS
We thus find ourselves facing three permutations of lawyer assistance
with client misconduct and an apparent consequential question: If the
authorities provide lawyers permission to assist where such assistance is
not expressly forbidden, does that permission imply a duty to aid a client
whose representation would be benefitted by such aid? The answer to that
question instinctively, and analytically, must be no.
A. Three Lawyer Postures
Given the available substantive law principles at play, the lawyer's
role responsibilities when encountering client plans that implicate
unlawful actions fit within three separable, and seemingly mutually
exclusive, categories. These categories address the client's unlawful
conduct and the lawyer's possible assistance of that forbidden activity.
They do not address the separate category involving unlawful activity
151. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1740 (2017).
152. Id. § 404.1745; see also Drew A. Swank, The Social Security Administration's
Condoning of and Colluding with Attorney Misconduct, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 507, 519-20 (2012)
("Since 1980, when records were first maintained, a total of 178 attorneys and nonattomeys have
been suspended or disqualified from representing claimants before the Social Security
Administration.").
153. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-.7 (2017).
154. See 37 C.F.R. § 11.19 (2017).
155. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1745 (2017); see also 35 U.S.C. § 32 (2012) (USPTO); 17 C.F.R.
§ 205.6.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
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under the professional codes for the lawyer herself to engage in, such as,
for example, offering false evidence to a tribunal"' or advising an
unrepresented person whose interests are adverse to the lawyer's client's
interests. 159 Because those latter activities are forbidden directly, the
questions examined here do not arise.
1. Criminal or Fraudulent Actions
There is no ambiguity that a lawyer may not counsel her client to
engage in a crime or a fraud and may not assist the client should the client
elect to do so. The lawyer may actively counsel her client about the
criminal or fraudulent nature of the activity and aid the client to
understand the consequences of proceeding, but if that latter counseling
encourages the crime or fraud, the lawyer most likely has violated Rule
1.2(d).1 60 As far as one may discern, though, no lawyer has been
disciplined for merely counseling a client about the consequences of,
without actively assisting with, the forbidden activity.161 Nevertheless,.
the absence of such precedent does not permit an inference that such
encouragement is acceptable.1 6 2
2. Unlawful Activity That Is Neither Criminal nor Fraudulent, but Does
Expose the Lawyer to Other Liability Risks
The professional regulatory apparatus will not discipline a lawyer for
active assistance with most remaining unlawful conduct beyond the
category of crime and fraud, but other substantive law may operate to
penalize or impose costs upon a lawyer who does so. The typical
examples of this category are assistance provided to a client to commits
an intentional tort, such as a breach of fiduciary duty,1 6 3  or
158. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2014).
159. Id. r. 4.3.
160. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 56 cmt. c (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) ("Proper advice to a client does not constitute assistance leading to liability.");
ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 133, at § 1.24(a); Green, supra note 5, at 1447 (defending
advice about enforcement practices); Pepper, Counseling, supra note 5, at 1548.
161. Research has uncovered no instance of a lawyer disciplined for a violation of Rule
1.2(d), or a state's variation of the ABA Rule with comparable content, for advising a client about
remedies or consequences without some affirmative assistance. Cf Banco Popular N. Am. v.
Gandi, 823 A.2d 809, 815 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (noting but not resolving, at the
pleading level, the fine line between advising about the law and assisting with fraud for purposes
of lawyer liability for aiding and abetting fraud), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 184 N.J. 161 (2005).
162. See id. (observing the difficulty in making distinction and implying that some advice
might reach the level of assistance).
163. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text. The earlier discussion noted the hurdles
a nonclient faces in asserting claims against a lawyer for damages for aiding an intentional tort,
but some nonclients have succeeded in such claims.
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encouragement to a client to breach a contract, resulting in interference
with a contractual relationship.' 6
It is also possible, although seemingly unlikely, that a lawyer may risk
a judgment against her for professional negligence or malpractice for
assisting a client in conduct for which the client is later found liable. At
least one authority has made this claim.165 The unlikelihood of this
exposure stems from two considerations. First, assuming the lawyer is
not negligent in her counseling role and either advises the client of the
possible risks in proceeding contrary to some regulatory scheme or
discloses accurately the costs of the resulting breach of contract or tort
action the client's stance will invite, no malpractice claim should
survive. 166 Second, it is typically a defense to a malpractice claim if the
client has unclean hands, or acts in pari delicto.
The [in pari delicto] defense is ... available only in
circumstances in which a client may reasonably be expected
to know that the activity is a wrong despite the lawyer's
implicit endorsement of it, for example when a client claims
to have followed the advice of a lawyer to commit perjury.1 67
A lawyer's collaborative strategy with a client to proceed knowingly in
the face of contrary legal authority should therefore not subject the lawyer
to the risk of suit by her own client. The only outside risk of a negligence
action arises if a trustee stands in the shoes of the client; in that setting,
the in pari delicto defense might not be available.1 68
164. See Eid, supra note 142, at 1217-18 (noting the qualified privilege that lawyers possess
against such suits).
165. See WENDEL, supra note 1, at 264 (citing FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 774
(9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 512 U.S. 79 (1994), aff'd in relevant respects on remand, 61 F.3d 17 (9th
Cir. 1995)).
166. See Wood v. McGrath, North, Mullin & Kratz, PC, 589 N.W.2d 103, 107 (Neb. 1999)
("Because the client bears the risk, it is the client who should assess whether the risk is
acceptable."); Union Planters Bank v. Thompson Coburn, 935 N.E.2d 998, 1022 (111. App. Ct
2010); Robert Kehr, Lawyer Error: Malpractice, Fiduciary Breach, or Disciplinary Offense?, 29
W. ST. L. REV. 235, 243-44 (2002).
167. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 54 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
168. See FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 61 F.3d 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1992) ("While a party may
itself be denied a right or defense on account of its misdeeds, there is little reason to impose the
same punishment on a trustee, receiver or similar innocent entity that steps into the party's shoes
pursuant to court order or operation of law."). That outside risk is the concern expressed by Brad
Wendel in his argument that assistance with client wrongdoing risks harm to the lawyer. WENDEL,
supra note 1, at 264.
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3. Unlawful Activity That Is Neither Criminal nor Fraudulent, but Does
Not Expose the Lawyer to Other Liability Risks
The final category of assistance involves client illegality for which the
lawyer does not risk any outside sanction or claims for damages. This is
a real category, even if some authorities imply otherwise.16 9 While some
assistance of illegality permitted by the Model Rules will generate some
penalties for a lawyer, 1 7 0 not every instance will create that consequence.
And it is not the case that only de minimis wrongdoing fits this category.
Some serious wrongdoing by a client, assisted actively by a lawyer, will
be considered noncriminal and nonfraudulent, and will not lead to
separate sanctions or liability on the part of the lawyer. Consider, for
example, the advertising world. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
regulates deceptive advertising.171 Congress has endowed the FTC with
a number of enforcement remedies. For example, the FTC may issue
cease-and-desist orders1 7 2 and impose fines, including significant fines
for persistent and recidivist violators.1 73 Commercial actors and their
advertising agencies must regularly make important judgments about
whether a marketing campaign that stretches the truth qualifies as
"deceptive" under the FTC regulations and the agency's 1983 Policy
169. See, e.g., WENDEL, supra note 1, at 263-64 n.53 (arguing that the gap in Rule 1.2(b) is
addressed by other constraints on lawyering assistance).
170. That is, if the lawyer gets caught. Like some private actors, the lawyer might calculate
the odds of detection versus the cost of any resulting sanctions after detection. See Richard W.
Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the "Hand Formula," 4 THEORETICAL INQUfUES L. 145,
151-52 (2003) (discussing the "Learned Hand formula," introducing a cost-benefit analysis to
negligence law, in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947)). The cost-
benefit calculation may include the probability of detection. See Richard Craswell, Deterrence
and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 MIcH. L. REv. 2185, 2211-23
(1999); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs ofLegal Controls, 93
YALE L.J. 857, 881 (1984). The Model Rules, at least, appear to permit a lawyer to engage in such
cost-benefit analysis. See also William H. Simon, The Ethics Teacher's Bittersweet Revenge:
Virtue and Risk Management, 94 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1986 (2006) (noting that ethics instruction
typically overlooks "episodes in which lawyers who violate [legal ethics] precepts [escape]
sanctions and achieve unmitigated success").
171. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012) (making unlawful and authorizing the FTC to prevent "unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce"); id. § 45(n) (requiring the FTC to only
declare practices unlawful if the practices cause "or [are] likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers" and consumers cannot "reasonably avoid[|" the injury themselves); see Richard
Craswell, Regulating Deceptive Advertising: The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L.
REv. 549, 571 (1991) (discussing, for example, the FTC's prohibition of certain cigarette
advertisements in the 1950s and early 1960s).
172. FED. TRADE COMM'N, OPERATENG MANUAL 3 (1976), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/attachments/ftc-administrative-staff-manuals/ch05orders.pdf
173. Id. at 13; see Gerard M. Stegmaier& Wendell Bartnick, Another Round in the Chamber:
FTC Data Security Requirements and the Fair Notice Doctrine, 17 J. INTERNET L. 17, 22 (2013)
(reporting FTC fine of $22.5 million against Google for multiple violations of a consent order).
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Statement on Deception. The latter requires minimum levels of
substantiation for any advertising claims made about products. 17 4 Those
actors and agencies rely on their counsel for guidance in assessing those
judgments. "'
A lawyer representing an advertising agency that elects to disseminate
an advertisement that cannot meet the FTC's deception standards may be
asked to assist in that campaign. Dissemination of the advertising would
be unlawful or illegal under the FTC standards, but not a crime or a
fraud.1 7 6 While the company bears the risk of FTC enforcement and any
possible fines, the lawyer bears no risk at all in her participation in that
conduct, given the scope of Rule 1.2(d) described above.1
The FTC and deceptive advertising example is just one of many, likely
countless, settings where a client's wrongdoing is neither criminal nor
fraudulent and no other external authority imposes any sanctions upon
the lawyer for her assistance with the wrongdoing.1 78 The question that
now arises is the scope of the lawyer's discretion to refuse to assist a
client in this latter setting. The next Subsection confronts that question.
174. See Letter from James Miller, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, to The Hon. John D.
Dingell, Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 14, 1983), https://www.ftc.gov/public-
statements/1983/10/fic-policy-statement-deception (mentioning the amorphous requirement that
advertisers must at least have a "reasonable basis" for advertising claims).
175. The Practising Law Institute, a national, nonprofit lawyer training and education
organization, offers at least one "Hot Topics in Advertising Law" day-long seminar each year for
subscribers. Each such seminar includes a session on the ethical issues confronted by those
lawyers in their guidance of their organizational clients. See, e.g., Hot Topics in Advertising Law
2017, PRAcTIsING LAW INST. (June 30, 2017), http://www.pli.edu/Content/OnDemand/
Hot TopicsinAdvertisingLaw 2017!_/N-4nZlzOolt?fromsearchfalse&ID-322340.
176. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 172, ch. 12 (omitting any reference to criminal
penalties for violation of FTC standards, except that a party who severely or frequently violates
an FTC injunction can be held in criminal contempt of court). For an example of the FTC charging
a company with violation of the FTC Act, see Complaint, Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. C-4454,(F.T.C. May 1, 2014), File No. 122-3010, 2014 WL 1993549 (discussing deceptive Nissan
Frontier pickup truck television ad).
177. Of course, the lawyer will advise the client of the risks it faces in proceeding with the
dissemination of the deceptive ad, including the likelihood of FTC action and the costs to the
agency client of any such actions taken. The client will then decide whether to proceed. While
commentators have grappled with the challenging question of whether a lawyer may counsel a
client about such enforcement consequences when the action is criminal, see, e.g., Pepper,
Counseling, supra note 5, at 1551-52, in this setting, because the lawyer could actively assist with
the unlawful activity, that challenging question is moot.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46 (the example of Winterport Graceful
Movement from the introduction, where the lawyer's startup client chose to proceed with the use
of material for which the business did not possess intellectual property rights, is one of those
settings); see also supra text accompanying notes 147-52 (discussing the fact that certain
government agencies, like the Securities and Exchange Commission, can discipline attorneys for
failure to meet their respective representational standards).
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B. The Scope ofLawyer Discretion to Refuse Assistance
If a client asks a lawyer to perform legal work that assists the client
with unlawful activity that is not criminal, fraudulent, or otherwise
prohibited by the Model Rules, may a lawyer nevertheless refuse to do
so? If so, on what grounds? Ordinarily, a lawyer will act with zeal and
commitment to support her client's interests,17 9 so if the Rules provide
the lawyer permission to proceed, the lawyer needs a different basis to
refuse the service from the claim that she is prohibited from aiding her
client.
If the activity exposes the lawyer to some liability and the lawyer does
not choose to accept that risk, the lawyer has ample grounds to refuse the
client's request. A lawyer who is unwilling to accept the exposure
inherent in assisting a client in wrongdoing, where such exposure exists,
develops a conflict of interest with his client, and must take appropriate
actions to address that conflict.' 80 Presumably, the client will agree not to
use the lawyer's services for the client's illegal strategy, and with that
agreement (assuming that the lawyer's continuing work for the client
actually-rather than inadvertently-assists the client in the illegality 8 1 ),
the lawyer will continue the representation.1 8 2 If the client insists on the
lawyer's assistance with the unlawful and cost-imposing conduct, the
lawyer arguably must withdraw from the representation to avoid a
violation of Rule 1.7.183 Rule 1.16(a) requires withdrawal when necessary
to avoid violating a rule.1 8 4 Even if not required, the withdrawal is likely
permitted. Rule 1.16(b)(4) affords counsel the opportunity to withdraw
from representation of a client if "the client insists upon taking action that
the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a
fundamental disagreement." 8 5 That discretion exists even if the lawyer's
179. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. I (AM. BAR Ass'N 2014) ("A lawyer
must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in
advocacy upon the client's behalf.").
180. Id. r. 1.7 cmt. 2.
181. See ROTUNDA & DzIENKowsKI, supra note 133, § 1.2-.4 (discussing the possibility of
advising a client about consequences, not withdrawing, but not assisting).
182. Because no rule prohibits the lawyer from affirmatively assisting the client, any
inadvertent assistance that might result from the lawyer's continued work with the client will not
present any disciplinary risks for the client. Whether the lawyer may face civil liability for
inadvertent aiding of a client's wrongdoing is a matter beyond the scope of this Article. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(a) cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1979) ("One who innocently,
rightfully and carefully does an act that has the effect of furthering the tortious conduct or
cooperating in the tortious design of another is not for that reason subject to liability.").
183. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(2) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2014).
184. Id. r. 1.16(a)(1).
185. Id. r. 1.16(b)(4).
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ceasing work for the client ends up harming the client's interest, 186 and
any such client would be unlikely to challenge the withdrawal if based on
the combination of illegal activity and risk of harm to the lawyer
himself.1 8 7 While that permissive-withdrawal basis is construed strictly
and requires serious concern,1 88 the lawyer's risk of civil liability or costs
ought to satisfy the standard.1 89
If the unlawful activity proposed by the client exposes the lawyer to
no liability but the lawyer believes that he should not participate in it,
then he ought to retain the same discretion to demur, and it is difficult to
imagine any risk to the lawyer in doing so. The lawyer would likely rely
on the same "serious disagreement" standard of Rule 1.16(b)(4) just
described. The lawyer would also refer to Rule 1.16(a)(1), even if the
discussion here has concluded that, its literal reading notwithstanding,
that provision does not require the lawyer to withdraw.1 90 As above, it is
difficult to imagine a client challenging a lawyer's choice not to aid the
client in actions that are illegal.
186. Id. r. 1.16 cmt. 7.
187. At least one authority has concluded that, when moving to withdraw on the basis of
Rule 1.16(b)(4), a lawyer may not reveal to the court the basis for the lawyer's conclusion of
repugnance or serious disagreement. See Oregon St. Bar Formal Op. No. 2011-185 (2011). That
opinion does agree, though, that if the judge hearing a motion to withdraw requires further
information, the lawyer may disclose otherwise confidential matters pursuant to Rule 1.6(b)(6).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT r. 1.6(b)(6) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2014) (revelation allowed "to
comply with . .. a court order").
188. The repugnance exception "applies only when the lawyer's feeling of repugnance is of
such intensity that the quality of the representation is threatened." GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET
AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 51.5, at 51-57 (4th ed. 2014). It "does not extend to cases in which
the lawyer and the client merely disagree; it is limited instead to cases of such profound and
irremediable inability to work together that no reasonable lawyer could continue the
representation." WENDEL, supra note 1, at 144.
189. While examples of successful use of the "repugnant" or "substantial disagreement" tests
from Rule 1. 16(b)(4) are scarce in case reports, commentators have agreed that the provision may
be used by lawyers to meet their gatekeeping duties. See, e.g., Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 9,
at 28 (suggesting that Rule 1.1 6(b)(4) may be relied upon to meet the "public interest obligation
of lawyers to act to protect society by refusing to assist, and thereby discouraging, their clients'
misconduct"); Zacharias, Coercing Clients, supra note 7, at 497.
190. The counseling moment where a lawyer relies upon Rule 1.16(a)(1) would involve some
delicate discussion. The lawyer might show the client the language of that rule, stating that the
lawyer must not proceed with the representation if the result will be a violation of the law. If the
analysis in this Article is sound, the lawyer will know that Rule 1.16(a)(1) does not actually mean
what it says, if the illegal activity is neither criminal nor fraudulent See supra text accompanying
notes 102-23. The lawyer therefore cannot imply to the client that the language means something
that it does not mean. Model Rule 2.1, in its Comments, advises an attorney to give the client her
"honest assessment" and "candid advice" regarding a proposed course of action. MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 2.1 cmt. I (AM. BAR Ass'N 2014). The lawyer's most likely course of
action would be to show the client Rule 1.16(a)(1), point out that ethicists disagree about its
meaning, but that the lawyer prefers to eliminate any risk that the rule might mean what it says.
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IV. DISCRETION To AssiST CLIENT WRONGDOING IN PRACTICE
This final Part assesses the meaning of Rule 1.2(d) in context for
lawyers working at street level with clients. It first endeavors to
understand the ABA's message in its choice to carve out some discretion
for noncriminal and nonfraudulent illegality. That assessment
hypothesizes that the ABA opted for the existing compromise as the only
reliable way to permit lawyers to guide clients in borderline but
acceptable conduct that by some broader definitions would be deemed
unlawful. Next, Subsection IV.B suggests a framework, relying on the
vibrant "moral activism" understanding of lawyer roles and
responsibilities, for lawyers' exercise of the discretion that the ABA's
compromise grants. That discussion reveals a reversal of the usual moral
activism concerns, where lawyers have been criticized for pursuing
"legal" means that accomplish immoral ends. Here, lawyers must choose
which illegal means to pursue and which to refuse to assist, using the
same considerations that the activists develop. Subsection IV.C then
applies that assessment to the three lawyering stories that introduced the
Article.
A. The Bar's Vision
The ABA's chosen message, as indicated through the language and
indicated carve-outs in Rule 1.2(d), must be analyzed to understand the
Bar's vision as to the application of the Rule to lawyers in practice.
1. The ABA's Drafting Strategy
In 1983, the ABA had a choice in drafting a mandatory disciplinary
rule related to lawyer assistance with client wrongdoing. It could have
prohibited lawyer assistance with "illegal" conduct, including criminal or
fraudulent activity.19 ' Doing so would have been easy, as the then-
existing Model Code of Professional Responsibility included exactly that
prohibition,1 92 and its predecessor, the 1908 Canons of Professional
Ethics, similarly employed broader language about wrongdoing.1 93
Instead, over the objections of certain of its constituents,1 94 the ABA
191. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
193. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 15 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1908) ("[I1t is steadfastly to be
borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the
bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for
any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicane.").
194. See supra text accompanying notes 64-71.
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elected to limit the prohibition to the most serious (in its view' 95 ) of
wrongdoing.
The limited legislative history of the Kutak Commission's
deliberations and the ABA's treatment of its proposals do not shed much,
if any, light on the reasoning behind the ABA's choice. One possible
explanation would be that the ABA affirmatively supported and
encouraged lawyers' aiding clients in all illegal conduct except that
itemized in Rule 1.2(d). That hypothesis simply defies belief. A more
plausible explanation would be that the Kutak Commission and the ABA
House of Delegates feared that the continued use of the term "illegal"
from the Model Code would restrict lawyer representational choices
unacceptably, encompassing in its coverage some useful and legitimate
legal work along with some work that lawyers ought not to engage in.
Some commentary has supported this hypothesis,1 96 and it seems
plausible. Other commentators have argued that the language of Rule
1.2(d) describes what the ABA meant by its use of the term "illegal" in
the Model Code, 197 confirming the limited coverage but not a change of
policy.
The worries that Kutak Commission participants would have
identified most likely included aiding a client to breach contracts,19 8
drafting contracts later determined to be unconscionable,' 99 and assisting
a client who had made the cost-benefit assessment that an intentional tort
would be worth the risks.2 0 0 As noted above, breaching a contract (and
accepting the costs of such breach), or committing a tort (and accepting
195. Like most of the statements in this Subsection, this is entirely speculation, but surely
reliable speculation. There can be little doubt that the ABA and its Kutak Commission viewed
crimes and frauds as the most worrisome of client wrongdoing, and therefore identified those
categories as warranting the prohibition. See Pierce, supra note 9, at 746-47 (discussing that
assessment).
196. See WOLFRAM, supra note 8, at 704 (implying that the ABA in 1983 worried about
exposing lawyers to liability for assisting with contracts found to be unconscionable); Bundy &
Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary System?, supra note 6, at 324 ("That choice appears
most plausible on the assumption that the crime-fraud line accurately distinguishes those laws
that, because they are narrowly drawn around the most egregious conduct, that [sic] are relatively
less overinclusive and relatively more worrisome in terms of underdeterrence.").
197. See James M. Altman, Modern Litigators and Lawyer-Statesmen, 103 YALE L.J. 1031,
1062 n.145 (1994) (discussing Rule 1.2(d) and DR 7-102(A)(7) and "virtually identical" in their
coverage); Hazard, supra note 17, at 277 (the Rule 1.2(d) language "is substantially identical to"
the "cognate provision" of DR 7-102(A)(7)).
198. See Pierce, supra note 9, at 900.
199. See id. at 901; see WOLFRAM, supra note 8, at 704.
200. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 370 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (finding
Ford to have engaged in cost-benefit analysis in deciding whether to spend money to improve
safety of Ford Pinto to reduce costs resulting from accident-related injuries and deaths); see also
DAvID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 206-10 (1988) (finding the same).
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the risk of damages to be paid to the victim), may not have been deemed
"illegal" and therefore would not have been disciplinable under the
Model Code. 201' But because of the ambiguity of that assertion,
maintaining the Model Code's language in the Model Rules could have
the effect of chilling a lawyer's guidance of clients whose business
decisions include accepting the risks of damages for certain actions. The
ABA likely changed the language of the prohibition to avoid that chilling
effect.
While both the Model Code202 and its successor, the Model Rules,203
permit-and arguably encourage 204-lawyers to assist clients to
determine the scope or the validity of a law, assisting a client to breach a
contract or to engage in an intentional tort may be viewed as not falling
into that type of general exception. In light of that worry and given the
consensus that lawyers ought not be disciplined for working with a client
who, for economically rational reasons, opts not to honor a contract or
exercise due care in addressing a duty, one may understand the ABA's
reluctance to continue to ban lawyer assistance with "illegal" conduct.
But that rationale, based on a client's breach of contract or tortious action,
does not address the parallel question of other forms of civil illegality,
particularly some regulatory infractions. 205 It is not at all clear what the
Kutak Commission and the ABA expected lawyers' duties to be when
their clients opt not to comply with regulatory duties, assisted by the
lawyers' work. What seems sufficiently clear, though, is that the language
chosen by the ABA permits that assistance.
201. See Hazard, supra note 3, at 706-07 (noting that ambiguity); Pepper, Counseling, supra
note 5, at 1566. At least some authorities viewed some intentional torts as subject to the Model
Code's "illegality" language. See Lischer, supra note 88, at 622 ("[Cjonspiracy is an intentional
tort, and ... [p]articipation in a conspiracy may be a separate ground for discipline as a violation
of [Model Code] DR 7-102(A)(7)."). No instances of a lawyer actually being disciplined for
violation of DR 7-102(A)(7) for assisting a client with an intentional tort may be found, however.
See Pepper, Counseling, supra note 5, at 1593 (finding no cases, as of 1995, of a lawyer
disciplined for advice without active assistance with a crime or fraud).
202. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSiBILITY EC 7-3 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1969).
203. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2014).
204. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94 cmt. f (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (addressing the lawyer's responsibility to advise clients about the limits of the
applicable law). But see Pepper, Counseling, supra note 5, at 1589-90 (noting that the ABA in
Rule 1.2(d) included discretion, but no duty, to advise clients about the legal limits of their
proposed conduct, implying some uncertainty about the benefits of that service).
205. See, e.g., Pepper, Counseling, supra note 5, at 1592 (citing violation of the National
Labor Relations Act as an example of noncriminal unlawfulness).
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2. The "Boundary Claim" and Lawyer Exceptionalism
The apparent discretion lawyers have to aid clients in some activity
that the state has forbidden invites consideration of the "boundary claim"
and its accompanying notions of lawyer exceptionalism. The question to
be explored here is whether the Rule 1.2(d) limitations evidence another
example of "the law between the bar and the state,"2 06 in which the bar's
commitment to "the bounds of the law" evidences some feebleness when
the issue is lawyer behavior on behalf of client interests.
The boundary claim, as we saw above,2 0 7 is the central ethical
commitment among lawyers to limit their representational actions to "the
bounds of the law." 208 This type of claim has received significant
attention, not only regarding the ambiguity and manipulability of its
"bounds," leading critics to question the depth of its actual substance,2 0
but also regarding the bar's questionable adherence to that commitment
where the law of lawyering is concerned. 2 1 0 The latter is particularly
relevant for the purposes of this Article. Most notably in the context of
client confidentiality, critics observe that, rather than encouraging full
fidelity to legal authority, the bar "actively and openly encourage[s]
disobedience of other law" that requires disclosure. 2 1 1 The bar assumes a
posture of "exceptionalism" vis-a-vis state law when lawyer advocacy
and protection of client interests is at issue.2 12
The question of interest to the assessment of Rule 1.2(d) is whether
the bar's approach to lawyers' assistance with wrongdoing serves as
another example of this exceptionalism stance-one that transcends the
well-explored confidentiality context. While there is an available
narrative that fits this premise, a more plausible narrative offers a less
cynical understanding of the bar's strategic intentions.
The less flattering narrative would look something like this: The bar
respects the state for its substantive authority represented by its statutes
and regulations and requires bar members to honor that authority at the
206. See generally Koniak, supra note 28, at 1401-02.
207. See Wilkins, supra note 18, at 269 (describing this notion as "the one relatively fixed
star in the legal ethics universe").
208. The "boundary claim" phrase originated with David Wilkins. See Wilkins, Legal
Realism, supra note 46, at 471.
209. See id Brad Wendel has called the claim "[t]he most shopworn aphorism in legal
ethics." W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1167, 1181
(2005).
210. See, e.g., Rebecca Aviel, The Boundary Claim's Caveat: Lawyers and the
Confidentiality Exception, 86 TUL. L. REv. 1055, 1057 (2012); Susan P. Koniak, When the
Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLuM. L. REv. 1236, 1255 (2003).
211. Koniak, supra note 28, at 1419.
212. Aviel, supra note 210, at 1087; Sung Hui Kim, Lawyer Exceptionalism in the
Gatekeeping Wars, 63 SMU L. REv. 73, 97 (2010).
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risk of some professional sanction, but only where that authority concerns
the most serious misconduct-that is, criminal and fraudulent acts.
Otherwise, this narrative proceeds, members of the bar may choose to
honor the laws of the state as they and their clients please. This selective
fidelity is necessary in order to ensure that clients receive the most
zealous and faithful assistance from their counsel.
A less cynical and more hopeful narrative would look something like
this: The bar respects the state for its substantive authority represented by
its statutes and regulations and requires bar members to honor that
authority at the risk of some professional sanction. Articulating and
enforcing that professional obligation presents challenges, though. To
insist that lawyers never assist clients with "illegal" or "unlawful" actions
risks overbreadth, chilling the delivery of necessary legal services to
clients. 2 1 3 Therefore, the bar will only impose discipline where the
misconduct is unambiguously criminal or fraudulent. 2 14 While this
enforcement strategy quite plainly results in underinclusion, the bar
expects its members not to exploit that interpretive gap in ways that are
harmful to third parties. 2 15
The bar's relative silence about the lacuna generated by Rule 1.2(d)'s
language leaves the choice of narrative to any individual lawyer's
imagination. It is easy to state, though, that the second narrative is far
preferable, and not at all inconsistent with the limited legislative history
and commentary about Rule 1.2(d).
B. Exercising Discretion in Assistance with Unlawful Conduct
Let us turn to the lawyers in the field. We now understand that the risk
of professional sanction for assisting a client with unlawful activity that
is neither a crime nor a fraud is either zero (if the analysis developed here
is sound) or, at worst, pretty close to zero (given the conceded ambiguity
within the ABA's standards recognized above 2 1 6 ). Will a lawyer, then,
readily aid a client who requests such assistance? And, more importantly,
should she?
The answer to the latter question is relatively easy to state but
maddeningly complicated to implement. A lawyer ought to exercise the
permitted discretion to assist clients in unlawful conduct when doing so
achieves desirable results but should refuse assistance when that
213. See Bundy & Elhauge, Knowledge ofLegal Sanctions, supra note 6, at 324.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See supra text accompanying note 103 (discussing the implications of Rule 1.16(a)(1)).
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contribution leads to undesirable results.2 17 The "desirability" quality
may be discerned from grounded notions of moral commitments or
substantive justice.218 In their deliberations, lawyers may be informed by
the long-standing debates within legal ethics circles about what is often
referred to as "moral activism."
Legal ethicists have long engaged with the question of a lawyer's
responsibility when the exercise of his client's legal rights causes what
the lawyer determines is a clear moral wrong.219 Legal ethics scholars and
moral philosophers with quite differing vieWS22 0 explored whether a
lawyer ought to be "morally activist" 2 2 1 and refuse to aid clients when
doing so would achieve immoral (or unjust2 2 2) ends, even if the law
supported that aid,223 or whether she should remain faithful to the client's
217. The "desirability" test is one employed by Professors Kaplow and Shavell in their
theoretical examination of the value of lawyer advice. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6, at
586.
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client
Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1004, 1014-15 (1990) (responding
to Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 116, 147-
51 (1990) (reviewing LUBAN, supra note 200)).
220. The debates began in earnest in the 1970s and have continued since, with the most
vibrant activity occurring in the 1980s and 1990s. Contributors to the early moral activism
enterprise included ALAN GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETEcs 1
(1980); Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New Role Morality for Lawyers, 51 MD. L. REV. 853, 855
(1992); Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics ofAdvocacy, 4 STAN. L. REv. 3, 3 (1951); Charles Fried,
The Lawyer as Friend The Moral Foundations ofthe Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060,
1060-61 (1976); Gerald Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV.
63, 63 (1980); Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in THE GOOD LAWYER:
LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETmcs 150 (D. Luban ed. 1983); William H. Simon, The
Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29, 30;
Maura Strassberg, Taking Ethics Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurisprudence in Legal Ethics, 80
IOWA L. REV. 901, 901 (1995); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral
Issues, 5 HuM. RTS. 1, 1 (1975).
221. The "moral activism" phrase appears to have originated with David Luban. See LUnAN,
supra note 200, at xxii; Luban, supra note 219, at 1014.
222. William Simon has articulated a moral-activism stance based not on moral concerns,
but on a commitment to justice. See WLLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF
LAWYERS' ETmUCS 15 (1998); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L.
REV. 1083, 1083 (1988) (arguing that "[1]awyers should have ethical discretion to refuse to assist
in the pursuit of legally permissible courses of action and in the assertion of potentially
enforceable legal claims," and that such discretion is "a professional duty of reflective judgment").
223. See generally Katherine R. Kruse, Professional Role and Professional Judgment:
Theory and Practice in Legal Ethics, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 250, 263 (2011) (discussing higher
moral duties that a lawyer may have); Luban, supra note 219 (discussing the legal system's ability
to go beyond a moral duty); Paul R. Tremblay, Moral Activism Manqud, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 127,
148 (2002) (noting the fact that lawful actions can still be morally wrong).
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apparent legal interests and support the client's autonomous choices. 2 2 4
The nub of the debate within moral-activism circles is whether a lawyer
ought to provide concededly lawful services to a client when doing so
causes significant harm. Wendel argues that fidelity to the law ought to
trump the lawyer's personal moral considerations; 2 2 5 Professor David
Luban2 2 6  and others 227  disagree, arguing that substantive law
commitments cannot justify recognizably harmful actions.
The differing perceptions about the proper role of lawyer response to
perceived injustice or unfairness emerge from a reasonably shared
acknowledgement of a prima facie duty to obey the law. 2 28 Some point
out that lawyers especially, given their role as officers of the court, ought
to honor that fundamental commitment.2 29 That duty may be undercut by
unjust lawS23 o or facially fair laws whose execution in a particular
circumstance creates discrete harm. 2 3 1 The moral activism critics, whom
Luban terms the "new wave of ethics theoreticians,"232 accept a stronger
application of that duty than do the moral activists, but the latter accept
the necessity of that baseline commitment at some presumptive level.
While lawyers practicing their craft at the retail level may not be in a
224. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMIrr, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 50 (4th
ed. 2010); WENDEL, supra note 1, at 53; W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLuM. L.
REv. 363, 363 (2004); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a
Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 614 (1986).
225. WENDEL, supra note 1, at 54-59.
226. See Luban, supra note 22, at 678 (reviewing WENDEL, supra note 1).
227. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Fidelity to Community: A Defense of Community Lawyering,
90 TEx. L. REv. 635, 653-55 (2012) (reviewing WENDEL, supra note 1); William H. Simon,
Authoritarian Legal Ethics: Bradley Wendel and the Positivist Turn, 90 TEx. L. REv. 709, 718-
22 (2012) (reviewing WENDEL, supra note 1).
228. For a discussion of that topic generally, see, e.g., George C. Christie, On the Moral
Obligation to Obey the Law, 1990 DuKE L.J. 1311; Kent Greenawalt, The Natural Duty to Obey
the Law, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1985); John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty ofFair Play, in
LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 3, 3 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964) ("I shall assume, as requiring no argument,
that there is, at least in a society such as ours, a moral obligation to obey the law, although it may,
of course, be overridden in certain cases by other more stringent obligations.").
229. See WENDEL, supra note 1, at 55-56; Kamin & Wald, supra note 53, at 925; Wilkins,
supra note 18, at 289-90. But see James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the
Characterization "Officer of the Court, " 48 BUFF. L. REv. 349, 408 (2000) (discerning no greater
duty than non-lawyers).
230. WENDEL, supra note 1, at 113; Wilkins, supra note 18, at 287.
231. LUBAN, supra note 200, at 32-43.
232. Luban, supra note 22, at 675-76 (including Tim Dare, Katherine Kruse, Daniel
Markovits, Norman Spaulding, and Bradley Wendel in that group).
233. See, e.g., id. at 684 ("When the law represents a genuine scheme of social cooperation,
disobedience is a form of free riding, and it expresses disdain for one's fellows."); Simon, supra
note 227, at 721 (arguing that "principled noncompliance" with the law is justified, albeit arising
infrequently).
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position to resolve the oftentimes intricate philosophical debates among
the activists and the new wavers,2 3 4 they will recognize that the ethical
deliberation begins with a presumption against assisting with unlawful
action.
Because that commitment is only presumptive, lawyers working at the
street level deserve guidance on the question of how to exercise the
discretion the Model Rules allow them. For the activists, that exercise of
discretion ought to mirror the approach that lawyers should follow when
confronted with legal entitlements that generate injustice. For the new
wave critics, the response is more complicated. Let us review the
separable approaches.
For the moral activists, 2 3 5 the stance of the state following the ABA's
lead, not penalizing a lawyer who aids in his client's wrongdoing is in
some ways a welcome development. Here's why. The moral activists
accept a weaker presumption of the shared duty to honor legal
obligations.2 3 6 The activists trust legal institutions and the reliability of
positive law less than new-wave writers,237 and if honoring legal
commitments leads to recognizable harm or injustice, lawyers ought not
participate in advancing those legal commitments. This is true even if
their clients have a purported right, based on positive law, to take the
action in question. The most common setting for this response is where a
client's exercise of some inarguably legal right leads to unwarranted harm
to others. 2 3 8 The moral-activism response, therefore, is frequently
234. Kruse, supra note 223, at 251-52. See generally Deborah J. Cantrell & Kenneth Sharpe,
Practicing Practical Wisdom, 67 MERCER L. REv. 331 (2016) (discussing the various roles
lawyers play).
235. The discussion here includes William Simon within the group this Article refers to as
the "moral activists," while conceding that for him the term is inapposite. Simon is an activist for
sure, but he does not base his activism in conceptions of morality. His argument is that lawyers
ought to act proactively to achieve justice even if contrary to positive-law authority and the
interests of clients. See SIMON, supra note 222, at 38-39. The notion of justice is not grounded in
considerations of common morality; instead, it must be based on legal principles and purposes.
See William H. Simon, The Legal and the Ethical in Legal Ethics: A BriefRejoinder to Comments
on The Practice ofJustice, 51 STAN. L. REv. 991, 993 (1999).
236. Luban, supra note 22, at 677; SIMON, supra note 222, at 103-04. For Simon, the topic
of prima facie obligation "begs the question of what we mean by law." Id at 103.
237. W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics Is About the Law, Not Morality or Justice: A Reply
to Critics, 90 TEX. L. REV. 727, 737-38 (2012).
238. Activist writers, and new-wave writers responding to the activists, often use the
example of the wealthy defendant who seeks to rely on a statute of limitations defense to avoid
repayment of a just debt to a needy plaintiff. See, e.g., TiM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES?: A
DEFENCE OF THE STANDARD CONCEPTION OF THE LAWYER'S ROLE 2-3, 48-51 (2009); LUBAN,
supra note 200, at 9-10; WENDEL, supra note 1, at 27-28; Stephen Pepper, Integrating Morality
and Law in Legal Practice: A Reply to Professor Simon, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1011, 1014-
15 (2010); Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1,
54-55 (2003); Susan Wolf, Ethics, Legal Ethics, and the Ethics ofLaw, in THE GOOD LAWYER,
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contrary to the lawyer's client's interest.239 But some powerful activism
stories present the opposite valence-where a recognized, presumptively
valid law thwarts a client's achievement of a just result, calling upon the
lawyer to assist the client to evade or ignore that law. In their arguments,
the moral activists rely with some frequency on stories from the civil
rights struggles, for instance, to make that point.2 40
For the former, more common activist stories where the client aims to
exploit the positive law for its benefit and the lawyer resists, the state's
stance on the assistance of unlawful conduct is irrelevant. The
professional rules about assisting clients with unlawfulness say nothing
at all to lawyers about their refusal to aid clients to achieve what the law
offers to them, such as the extinguishment of a just debt after the statute
of limitations has expired. 2 4 1 The activist writing is seldom clear enough
about how the lawyer ought to implement his refusal to aid a client in the
unjust or immoral enterprise,24 2 but the implication within the literature
is that the professional rules do not provide sufficiently safe space for the
lawyer to meet his moral commitments without fear of discipline. 2 4 3
For the latter, less common activist stories, the state's stance offers
some solace, albeit limited. The state's choice to limit the scope of Rule
1.2(d) offers a recognition that at times, a client's choice to disobey a
presumptively valid law, while exposing the client to risk of penalty or
cost, is not so fundamentally offensive that a lawyer must take pains to
distance herself from that action. Sometimes, the state seems to be saying,
it is acceptable for the lawyer to work with clients who choose not to
comply with their duties. That attitude is precisely what the activists
profess. And, in those (perhaps unusual24) moral-activism settings where
the client's civil disobedience does not qualify as a crime or a fraud, the
supra note 220, at 38, 46, 59; see also Zabella v. Pakel, 242 F.2d 452, 455 (7th Cir. 1957)
(reporting such a setting).
239. See Paul R. Tremblay, Practiced Moral Activism, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L. REv. 9, 40-41
(1995).
240. See, e.g., Alfieri, supra note 227, at 654; Simon, supra note 227, at 715.
241. See supra text accompanying note 238.
242. See Tremblay, supra note 239, at 9-12 (seeking to articulate how activists proceed in
practice when encountering moral conflict). The most lawfully available responses would be
seeking to withdraw from representation when the client's aims are repugnant, see MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b)(4) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2014), or engaging in what ethicists have come
to know as a "moral dialogue." For a discussion of both such remedies, see Katherine R. Kruse,
Lawyers, Justice, and the Challenge ofMoral Pluralism, 90 MrNN. L. REV. 389, 435, 442 (2005).
243. Tremblay, supra note 239, at 66-67.
244. Most of the civil rights and civil-disobedience stories likely include criminal activity,
though. See Martha L. Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social
Change, 52 U. Pirr. L. REv. 723, 726 (1991); Daniel T. Ostas, Civil Disobedience in a Business
Context: Examining the Social Obligation to Obey Inane Laws, 47 AM. Bus. L.J. 291, 291-92
(2010).
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lawyer's aid of his client is supported-or at least not condemned-by
the state bar.
A moral activist would suggest that the discretion the state offers to
lawyers to aid in wrongdoing should only be exercised in those settings
where adherence to the law would be intolerable or unjust-that is, in
those settings where, even were Rule 1.2(d)'s exemption not in place, the
lawyer would be inclined to collaborate with the client in evading the law
in question. Of course, Rule 1.2(d) ostensibly provides lawyers a pass
when assisting with much less noble lawbreaking. In that respect, the
state's stance is disheartening to the moral-activism project. The activists'
message to lawyers is something like the following: "If the law permits
your client to do X, but X is unacceptable when evaluated by standards
of morality or justice, you have a duty not to participate." The state's
message to lawyers may be understood to look something like the
following: "If the law forbids your client to do Y, but your client wants
to do Y because Y is in your client's interest, and doing so is neither a
crime nor a fraud, you may collaborate with your client to do Y." That
message, applied to, say, corporate misconduct, is contrary to the
activists' stance. 24 5
The response on the part of the new-wave critics is complicated in a
different way. The core of their response to activism is "fidelity" to those
institutions that seek to manage intractable disagreement through the
promulgation of (imperfect) substantive law. 2 4 6 The states that adopt the
ABA rules are such institutions. One might suppose, then, that the new-
wave ethicists support lawyers who exercise their discretion to aid in
wrongdoing if the lawyers and clients are willing to accept the risks of
that action, given the law-of-lawyering support for that stance. But, of
course, that proposition proves far too much.
When the state, following the lead of the ABA, provides attorneys
license to assist clients with certain forms of lawbreaking, that invitation
does not make the resulting assistance desirable or justified. If the
attorney assists the client primarily because it is in the client's economic
or similar interest to skirt the noncriminal and nonfraudulent law in
245. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 200, at 206-10 (discussing Ford's cost-benefit approach
to its design of the Pinto); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion ofthe Public Realm, 83 GEO.
L.J. 2619, 2624 n.27 (1995) (reviewing the secret terms of the Dalkon Shield settlement); see also
Joan MacLeod Heminway, The Role of Business Counsel as Compliance Gatekeepers: Toward
Understanding and Combatting Reckless Disregard for Legal and Ethical Compliance in
Business Entities, 62 WAYNE L. REv. 7, 17 (2016) (reporting that businesses regularly show
disdain for legal rules and business ethics); Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig
Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper's Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics ofFinancial Risk
Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1209, 1244-45 (2011) (describing lawyers' hypercompetitive
pressures to do what their business clients want).
246. See Simon, supra note 222, at 1114.
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question, the new-wave thesis would condemn the assistance as lacking
fidelity to the shared commitment that the underlying law represents. 247
The state's choice not to punish the collaborating lawyer does not
undercut the new-wave arguments at all. Like the moral activists, the
critics agree that the duty to obey the law is presumptive and must cede
to powerful counterarguments on occasion.2 8 The state's choice not to
interfere with the lawyer is no such counterargument, especially because
it provides only discretion, far from any duty, to assist in the wrongful
conduct.
What, then, does this mean for ordinary practicing lawyers without
deep philosophical training, familiarity with the sophisticated writing of
the competing ethicists, and perhaps even without reliable recollection of
the ethics training they received in law school?249 Many of those lawyers
may accept the oft-heard (if inaccurate) sentiment that their assistance
must remain within the bounds of the law250 and refuse to aid clients in
actions that violate any substantive law. There is no harm at all in that
practice orientation, subject to the activists' teaching about some need in
appropriate instances for civil disobedience. 25 1 This Article, however, is
more focused on the expected response by lawyers who appreciate the
discretion offered them by the ABA and their state bar authorities.
In the next Subsection, an examination of the three stories that
introduced this Article will serve to flesh out some appropriate responses
in context, but a few observations here ought to help frame the proceeding
discussion. Most critically, a lawyer ought not exercise her Rule 1.2(d)
discretion in a purely instrumental way, focusing only on client interest
and profitability without paying heed to the implications of his client's
illegal activity. While no law expressly prohibits that assistance, a lawyer
247. See Samuel J. Levine, The Law and the "Spirit of the Law" in Legal Ethics, 2015 J.
PROF. L. 1, 2-3 [hereinafter Levine, Spirit of the Law]; Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethical
Discretion Seriously: Ethical Deliberation as Ethical Obligation, 37 IND. L. REv. 21, 23-24
(2003) [hereinafter Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion Seriously].
248. WENDEL, supra note 1, at 113.
249. See Leslie Levin, The Ethical World ofSolo and Small Firm Practitioners, 41 Hous. L.
REv. 309, 368 (2004) (reporting that lawyers she surveyed "rarely consulted bar codes when
deciding how to handle ethical issues").
250. Sophisticated legal scholarship frequently overstates the breadth of the lawyer's duty to
avoid assisting with crimes or frauds. See, e.g., WENDEL, supra note 1, at 189 (the substantive law
"require[s] lawyers to refuse to assist a client in an action that is not permitted by the law");
Morrison, supra note 17, at 304 (the Model Rules "prevent an attorney from giving legal services
to clients who are going to engage in unlawful behavior with the attorney as their accomplice");
Zacharias & Green, supra note 15, at 16 (lawyers "may not participate in wrongdoing" (citing
Rule 1.2(d)).
251. See Louis Fisher, Note, Civil Disobedience as Legal Ethics: The Cause-Lawyer and the
Tension Between Morality and "Lawyering Law," 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 481, 489-90
(2016).
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ought to accept responsibility for her actions, and her peers may criticize
her if her assistance serves undesirable ends.2 52 Stephen Pepper offers the
story of a client engaged in a violation of the NLRA to show a setting
where Rule 1.2(d)'s limits on assistance would not apply, but where harm
to third parties could be significant.2 5 3 Assistance with an advertiser's
violation of the FTC rules and guidelines, as in the earlier example,2 5 4
serves as a similar cautionary example. But if the client's unlawful
strategy causes little or no harm to third parties or the public, and the
lawyer faces no risk herself for her participation, it is difficult to criticize
the lawyer for serving her client in that way.
One potentially worrisome component of this exercise of discretion is
the operation of cognitive biases within the lawyer's decision-making
calculus. 2 5 5 If the rubric proposed here is for the lawyer to assist clients
only when the balance of harm is low, the lawyer's ability to appreciate
that balance will be (not "may be") distorted by the biases to which
decision makers inevitably succumb.2 56 A lawyer contemplating such
assistance will always represent a client who prefers to engage in the
unlawful activity because doing so serves the client's interests. The
lawyer's responsibility is to assess the risk of harm triggered by the
unlawful action. Behavioral psychologists warn of the power of the self-
serving bias,2 5 7 confirmation bias,25 8 and similar shared cognitive
blockS 2 59 to distort such judgments. Lawyers need to be aware of these
252. As David Luban describes it, the lawyer may not rely on the "adversary system excuse"
to justify harmful actions. LUBAN, supra note 200, at 129-33. She must accept responsibility for
the aid she provides to her clients. David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to
Stephen Pepper, 1986 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 641-42. If no external authority penalizes the
lawyer for his assistance, peer criticism seems to be the only available remedy.
253. Pepper, Counseling, supra note 5, at 1592-93.
254. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
255. See Tigran W. Eldred, Insights From Psychology: Teaching Behavioral Legal Ethics as
a Core Element ofProfessional Responsibility, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REv. 757, 763, 765; Catherine
Gage O'Grady, Behavioral Legal Ethics, Decision Making, and the New Attorney's Unique
Professional Perspective, 15 NEV. L.J. 671, 677 (2015); Andrew M. Perlman, A Behavioral
Theory of Legal Ethics, 90 IND. L.J. 1639, 1649, 1651 (2015); Jennifer Robbennolt & Jean R.
Sternlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 Aiz. ST. L.J. 1107, 1129 (2013).
256. Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 255, at 1129; Tremblay, supra note 223, at 148.
257. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1094 (2000);
Perlman, supra note 255, at 1652 n.91.
258. See PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING,
AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS 277-89 (2010);
O'Grady, supra note 255, at 677-78.
259. See Eldred, supra note 255, at 763, 765-66; Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 255,
at 1129.
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limitations on their ability to assess risks accurately and perhaps adopt a
risk-averse approach to their exercise of discretion as a result.2 6 0
In those settings, and one expects that they will be very common,
where the lawyer opts not to aid his client in the wrongdoing, the lawyer
who appreciates the reach of Rule 1.2(d) will have a more complicated
conversation with her client when the wrongdoing is neither a crime nor
a fraud. It would most likely be preferable to such a lawyer to explain to
her client something like this:
Your proposal is understandable, but I need to advise you
that it violates our state's regulations, and therefore subjects
you to some risks. If you proceed while knowing those risks,
that is your choice, but I cannot work with you on that project
because my professional duties forbid me from assisting my
clients with unlawful actions.
That explanation is attractive but inaccurate. We know that the lawyer
may not beg off from the requested assistance by reference to some
overriding bar duty because no such bar duty exists, and the lawyer may
not pretend that it does.261 Therefore, the lawyer must have a more
nuanced, and possibly more difficult, conversation about why he chooses
not to collaborate on the project that fails to comply with some applicable
regulations.
C. Exercising Discretion in Context: The Three Stories
Let us complete this project by adding context to the foregoing
analysis to appreciate how a lawyer might respond to a client's request
for assistance with some unlawful conduct. This Article began with three
examples from the startup world. We return to those stories here.
The Independent Contractor Story:262 In this example, the attorney,
Emily Haile, has been asked by Jackson Sanchez, the CEO of WorkHub,
Inc., to draft independent-contractor agreements to offer to Diane Bilder
and Paulo Vose. Bilder and Vose are two friends who have agreed to
work for the company for minimal compensation now in return for
promises of equity, or at least better wages, later. Because of the work
they perform, Haile concludes that Bilder and Vose qualify as employees,
not independent contractors. Haile has explained to Sanchez the
implications for him and his company of not complying, but-given the
realities of the startup world-he is willing to proceed in this rogue way
260. See Eldred, supra note 255, at 763, 765-66.
261. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. BAR Ass'N2014) (explaining that a
lawyer owes his client a candid assessment of the circumstances of the representation).
262. See supra text accompanying notes 32-38.
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until the company has better cash flow. The story also asked us to assume
that Bilder and Vose are satisfied with the arrangement.
I understand this to be among the most common of the lawbreaking
stories within the startup community. 263 Effected carefully, the
arrangement should not qualify as fraud. The terms of the compensation
and the status offered to the two workers will be presented accurately,
without any deception. 26 The wage-and-hour laws are primarily
regulatory in nature, imposing, through state 265 and federal 266 provisions,
requirements on employers as a matter of public policy. It would seem,
then, that collaborating with WorkHub to produce honest, but unlawful,
compensation arrangements would be a permissible representational
strategy for Haile under Rule 1.2(d).
On further examination, though, the question is considerably more
complicated. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA) 267 imposes criminal
penalties for willful violations of the wage-and-hour laws, 68 as do some
states. 2 6 9 Given the counseling that Haile will have engaged in with
Sanchez about the state of the law, WorkHub's noncompliance with the
FLSA will qualify as "willful." A nascent startup employer like
WorkHub that fails to honor the wage-and-hour laws and is challenged
by an employee or a government agency will almost assuredly not be
subject to criminal penalties. 2 7 0 But no authority holds that Rule 1.2(d)
does not apply when the criminal enforcement is unlikely. 271 Developing
263. I have been unable to locate published accounts confirming that understanding, but
colleagues within private firms and transactional clinical practices tell me that this arrangement
is not unusual.
264. See, e.g., Luz M. Molina et al., Vulnerabilities of Low-Wage Workers and Some
Thoughts on Improving Workplace Protections: The Experience ofthe Workplace Justice Project,
17 Loy. J. PUB. INT. L. 215, 254 (2016) (explaining that intentional misclassification of workers
as independent contractors is sometimes labeled "payroll fraud"); see also Payroll Fraud
Prevention Act of 2014, H.R. 4611, 113th Cong. (2014) ("The Payroll Fraud Prevention Act of
2014" does not include the elements of common law fraud); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 538(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
265. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 15IA, § 47 (2016).
266. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
267. Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-204, 206-
207, 209-218, 218(b)-(c), 219 (2012)).
268. Id. § 216(a)-(b).
269. See, e.g., ch. 151A, § 47; Commonwealth v. N. Telecom, Inc., 517 N.E.2d 491, 492
(Mass. App. Ct 1988).
270. See MERRICK T. ROSSEIN, I EMp. L. DESKBOOK HUM. RESOURCES PROF. § 6:83 (2016)
(explaining that criminal charges arise most commonly when an employer covers up wrongdoing,
retaliates against a complaining employee, or engages in child-labor-law violations).
271. See Maine Prof I Ethics Comm'n, Op. No. 199 (July 7, 2010) (referring to marijuana
businesses, legal in Maine but not under federal law, stating that Maine's Rule 1.2(d) "does not
make a distinction between crimes which are enforced and those which are not"); see also Kamin
& Wald, supra note 53, at 901 (rejecting as failing the common-sense test "the position that no
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interpretations of Rule 1.2(d) as applied in the context of marijuana
possession or sale, which are lawful in some states 27 2 but unlawful at the
federal level,273  offer some leeway for attorney assistance with
unenforced criminal provisions. 27 4 However, those developments would
not apply to the wage-and-hour context, where the underlying obligations
are enforced aggressively, even if not criminally.
Given the requirements of Rule 1.2(d), this analysis would appear to
conclude that Haile may not assist WorkHub actively by drafting
independent-contractor agreements whose use constitutes a federal
crime. Two possible arguments would be available to Haile to permit
such assistance, and neither is fully persuasive.
The first argument examines the meaning of the term "assist" in Rule
1.2(d). If Haile produces for WorkHub the independent-contractor
agreements whose use by the client constitutes a federal crime, her work
has no doubt helped the client in effecting that crime. But, as Professors
Kamin and Wald suggest in their assessment of the role of lawyers for
marijuana businesses, Haile may not have "assisted" in the crime in a
manner forbidden by Rule 1.2(d). 27 5 Kamin and Wald argue that with
crimes that are mala prohibita rather than mala in se,2 76 a lawyer offering
conventional legal services that further the criminal act ought not be
subject to sanctions unless the attorney actively intended to assist in the
crime.2 7 7 Such intent typically calls for participation beyond the provision
of the types of legal services ordinarily offered to clients generally. 2 7 8
conduct can be criminal if the government is aware of the conduct and systematically fails to.
enforce the law").
272. See 29 Legal Medical Maryuana States and DC: Laws, Fees, and Possession Limits,
PROCON, http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourcelD=000881 (last
updated Oct. 13, 2017) (showing twenty-nine states with some legalization of marijuana).
273. See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844 (2012) (listing criminal
penalties).
274. See, e.g., State Bar of Arizona, Ethics Op. No. 11-01 (2011) ("[W]e decline to interpret
and apply [Arizona's Rule] 1.2(d) in a manner that would prevent a lawyer who concludes that
the client's proposed conduct is in 'clear and unambiguous compliance' with state law from
assisting the client in connection with activities expressly authorized under state law.");
Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers/Office of Bar Counsel, BBO/OBC Policy on Legal Advice
on Marituana (Mar. 19, 2017) (announcing that the BBO/OBC will not discipline lawyers for
"assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer reasonably believes is permitted by Massachusetts
statutes, regulations, orders, and other state or local provisions implementing them"); Kamin &
Wald, supra note 53, at 903-04.
275. Kamin & Wald, supra note 53, at 905-14.
276. For a discussion of the difference between those two categories of crimes, see Michael
L. Travers, Mistake ofLaw in Mala Prohibita Crimes, 62 U. Cu. L. REv. 1301, 1301 n.3 (1995);
Pepper, Counseling, supra note 5, at 1576.
277. Kamin & Wald, supra note 53, at 908-10.
278. Id at 917. Kamin and Wald then argue that lawyers practicing in states where marijuana
is legal and who offer conventional legal services (contract work, lease negotiation, entity
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That distinction is found in the law of criminal conspiracy and
accomplice liability.279 Applying that distinction to Haile's work with
WorkHub, if the FLSA violation is deemed a crime malum prohibitum
and the law firm provides to WorkHub the kinds of legal product offered
to business clients generally, the lawyer arguably will not have violated
Rule 1.2(d).
This first argument has two components. It requires both that a
violation of the FLSA qualifies as malum prohibitum and that the services
Haile provides are those offered to business clients generally. There can
be no doubt that in many, and perhaps most, contexts a violation of FLSA
constitutes a serious injustice causing cognizable harm to vulnerable
laborers, especially when contracting with undocumented immigrant
workers. 280 Wage-and-hour violations are not status crimes,281 and an
employer that disregards the FLSA may face significant liability. 28 2 But
in some settings, like that with WorkHub, where the business owners are
operating in good faith and the workers understand the arrangements and
voluntarily agree to work for the terms offered, the statutory prohibition
looks more like a status offense than an offense malum in se. The fact that
legal assistance with this kind of activity on behalf of startups is so
common 2 83 lends support to the conclusion that the potentially criminal
activity is not inherently exploitative or evil. In that context, Haile could,
under this reasoning, satisfy the first of the two elements necessary for
her to avoid discipline under Rule 1.2(d). 284
formation, etc.) to marijuana businesses have a good faith argument that they are not in violation
of Rule 1.2(d). Id. at 917-19.
279. See, e.g., United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 798 (7th Cir. 1985) (comparing a
shopkeeper who sells a dress to a prostitute with a gun dealer who sells a gun to customer who
will use it to murder a relative).
280. See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the
Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 415-
16 (1995); Nantiya Ruan, Same Law, Diferent Day: A Survey of the Last Thirty Years of Wage
Litigation and Its Impact on Low-Wage Workers, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 355, 367 (2013);
Michael Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 497,
509 (2004).
281. Typically crimes mala prohibita cause little inherent harm, but are criminal because a
statute has so stated. See Travers, supra note 276, at 1301 n.3 ("Examples of such crimes include
speeding and disposing of hazardous waste without the appropriate permit.").
282. See, e.g., Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1306 (W.D. Wash. 2001),
aff'd, 290 F.3d 1043, 1044 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining treatment of employees as freelancers
subjected Microsoft to damages; matter settled for $97 million).
283. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
284. Correspondingly, a law firm asked to participate in an exploitative, strategic effort to
misclassify workers under the FSLA would not satisfy this element, because in that context the
criminal activity may not be deemed to be malum prohibitum.
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The second element of the first possible defense is that Haile is only
providing legal services offered to clients generally. This element rests
on the formulation made famous by Judge Richard Posner in United
States v. Fountain,2 85 where Judge Posner noted the difference between a
dressmaker who sells clothing to a prostitute and a firearms dealer who
knowingly sells a gun to a person intending to commit a murder.2 8 6 The
dressmaker sells dresses to all customers, and the fact that a customer
uses the product to commit a crime (and notably a crime malum
prohibitum2 8 7) does not trigger conspiracy liability for the merchant. That
reasoning serves as the basis for the proposition that lawyers offering
corporate legal services to the marijuana industry ought not be deemed to
have "assisted" the federal crime in violation of Rule 1.2(d). 28 8
However solid that strand of reasoning is for the marijuana industry
lawyers, it is harder to sustain for a lawyer like Haile, who knowingly
provides an unlawful document to her client to be used expressly for a
purpose that is criminal. If Haile prepared a template independent-
contractor agreement to be used by WorkHub and Sanchez for lawful
purposes, and Sanchez then uses it with workers who are employees
under federal law, that seems to satisfy the Fountain formulation.
Similarly, if Haile were to create corporate formation documents for
WorkHub, a business that violated the FLSA, that would not present a
problem at all. But the example used here is far more direct and
intentional. Sanchez has asked Haile to draft independent-contractor
agreements for employees, and Haile aims to provide those documents.
That description appears to qualify as direct assistance with a crime.
The second argument available to Haile is perhaps more promising. If
WorkHub's use of independent-contractor agreements with these two
employees is not criminal, then Haile has discretion to provide that
service without running afoul of Rule 1.2(d). The questions for Haile,
then, are these: Does every willful violation of the FLSA, regardless of
the levels of harm and exploitation, qualify as a "crime?" Given the
availability of criminal penalties should a prosecutor pursue them? And
does she know that conclusion? 289 If Haile were to conclude that ordinary
285. 768 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1985).
286. Id. at 798; see also People v. Lauria, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628, 635 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)
(holding there was no conspiracy to commit prostitution by providing a telephone-answering
service).
287. Fountain, 768 F.2d at 798 (describing prostitution as "a minor crime").
288. Kamin & Wald, supra note 53, at 908; Eric Mitchell Schumann, Clearing the Smoke:
The Ethics of Multistate Legal Practice for Recreational Marituana Dispensaries, 6 ST. MARY'S
J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 332, 357-58 (2016) (discussing, but not adopting, the
argument).
289. Rule 1.2(d) requires that the lawyer "know" that the conduct is criminal. MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2014).
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misapplication of the FLSA such as that proposed by WorkHub is not
criminal, or that she does not know that it is,2" 0 then, the reasoning goes,
she may assist WorkHub without risking discipline for having violated
Rule 1.2(d).
The Nonprofit Solicitation Story: In this example of regulatory
noncompliance, the lawyer, Jonathan Shin, considers whether to work
closely with his nonprofit client, Advancement of Multilingual Justice
(AMJ), as it solicits donations before completing the registration with the
state's Office of the Attorney General (OAG), as the applicable state
statute requires. Ehsan Rahman, AMJ's founder and executive director,
has the opportunity to raise some money and worries that he needs to act
quickly, and the OAG is well-known for moving slowly to approve a
registration and issue the necessary "certificate of solicitation." 29 1
Rahman would use Shin's services in his efforts to solicit donors,
especially to explain how the donation might retroactively qualify as a
tax-deductible gift once AMJ obtains tax-exempt status.29 2
In AMJ's state, it is not a crime to fail to comply with the solicitation
statute, and nothing Rahman will do in his communications with donors
will qualify as fraud, as he intends to be transparent about the status of
AMJ. But the solicitation remains "unlawful." Therefore, Shin has
discretion to assist Rahman in his efforts but could also choose not to
assist because of the unlawful character of the activity. We may also
assume that nothing in the state's statutory or regulatory scheme
applicable to charitable solicitation addresses a penalty that Shin or his
law firm would risk. AMJ may face some penalties for its noncompliance,
but as Shin knows, the chances of any penalties being imposed are
insignificant, especially if AMJ proceeds to register and await its
certificate of solicitation expeditiously.
Shin may exercise his discretion to assist in the unlawful conduct of
AMJ without criticism. The violation of the law qualifies as malum
prohibitum and not malum in se.293 The world may be a better place if
AMJ can secure donations that might be missed if Rahman delays. Even
if that is not true, and even if Rahman is simply impatient to start
buttonholing prospective donors, Shin may decide that helping this
ambitious founder is a good use of the firm's resources. The firm might,
of course, decline to participate. It may, for example, elect to implement
an advance directive policy establishing that the firm will not participate
in any wrongdoing in order to stave off other more complicated requests
290. See Pierce, supra note 9 at 748-49 (discussing this factor in light of the ambiguity of
the criminal law).
291. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. We must assume for purposes of this
discussion that the state in which AMJ operates has adopted the ABA's version of Rule 1.2(d).
292. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
293. See Travers, supra note 276, at 1301 n.3.
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from clients. Or the firm's relationship with the Office of the Attorney
General might be such that it chooses not to risk any chance of its
assistance with noncompliance such as this becoming known to that
agency. But for present purposes, the critical conclusion is that neither
the standards governing lawyers, nor the ethos of the profession, would
censure Shin for offering his firm's aid to AMJ.
The Trademark Licensing Story: In this startup story, a law-school
clinic student, Anatoly Litmanovich, represents a new for-profit business,
Winterport Graceful Movement, through its founder and CEO, Yolanda
Moreno. Moreno hopes to license its curriculum and trademark to a
colleague in California and needs the clinic's assistance in drafting the
licensing agreement. The problem is that the nature of the arrangement,
in Litmanovich's opinion, qualifies as a franchise, not a license. The
franchise requirements, both nationally and in California, can be intense
and costly.294 Litmanovich and his faculty supervisor, Dara Bowman,
need to understand the clinic's alternatives.
Federal and state law prohibits WGM from proceeding without
compliance with the franchise requirements. Litmanovich's drafting of a
licensing agreement therefore qualifies as counseling and assisting a
client in illegal conduct. But it is not a crime to evade the franchise laws,
even if it is a regulatory infraction subjecting the franchisor to penalties.
Moreno will explain to her California colleague why WGM cannot afford
to offer a franchise agreement, so the colleague will not be deceived or
misled. Therefore, the conduct is not fraud. That colleague will have
rights under the franchise laws and could later assert them against
WGM, 295 and perhaps against Moreno personally. 296 Moreno understands
294. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
295. The federal franchising scheme does not permit a private right of action for injured
franchisees, although the FTC may bring a claim against the franchisor. See, e.g., Baum v. Great
W. Cities, Inc. of N.M., 703 F.2d 1197, 1209 (10th Cir. 1983); Dreisbach v. Murphy, 658 F.2d
720, 730 (9th Cir. 1981); Fulton v. Hecht, 580 F.2d 1243, 1249 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978). Some state
laws do permit a private right of action. See Bans Pasta, LLC v. Mirko Franchising, LLC, No.
7:13-cv-00360-JCT, 2014 WL 637762 (W.D. Va. Feb. 12, 2014) (explaining negligence per se
claim can be based on violation of FTC Franchise Rule); Akers v. Bonifasi, 629 F. Supp. 1212,
1221-22 (M.D. Tenn. 1984); KC Leisure, Inc. v. Haber, 972 So. 2d 1069, 1074 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2008) (holding violation of Florida DUTPA can be based on violation of FTC Franchise
Rule). But see LeBlanc v. Belt Ctr. Inc., 509 So. 2d 134, 137 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that
the failure of a franchisor to comply with the FTC disclosure regulations does not constitute an
unfair trade practice under state law where there is no element of fraud, misrepresentation,
deception, or unethical conduct in the creation of the franchise agreement).
296. See Edward Wood Dunham, The Liability of Shareholders, Officers, Directors, and
Employees for Franchise Law Violations, 13 FRANCHISE L.J. 101, 101 (1994); Cynthia M. Klaus,
Personal Liability of Franchisor Executives and Employees Under State Franchise Laws, 29
FRANCHISE L.J. 99, 99 (2009).
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those risks, and she considers them minimal given her relationship with
her colleague.
The question here is whether Litmanovich may lawfully produce the
licensing agreement for Moreno and WGM. The answer is yes. Should
he do so, or ought he decline to exercise that discretion? Putting aside the
no-doubt significant factor of his status as a clinical student, 29 7
Litmanovich ought not receive criticism for choosing to aid Moreno. The
federal and state franchise laws are far less easily assigned a label of mala
prohibita than the charitable solicitation example above. The franchise
laws are, we may assume, important consumer-protection vehicles which
aim to prevent the exploitation of franchisees. A business's evading those
laws could easily be considered malum in se, and therefore simply
unacceptable. But the story we encounter here is not that story. Moreno
and her California colleague both want this arrangement to happen, and
it cannot, and will not, happen if WGM must meet the stringent
requirements of the federal and state laws. It also will not happen-or
will be much harder to implement-without the clinic's help. As long as
the two contracting parties enter into the licensing agreement with a full
understanding of the risks and benefits of doing so, a lawyer who aids
them to achieve that end should not be reproached. No professional
lawyering authority bars Litmanovich from drafting the agreement, and
he may opt to do so without pangs of conscience.298
CONCLUSION
This Article demonstrates that the ABA, through its rule about
assisting clients with misconduct, and the states that have chosen to adopt
that rule, empower lawyers to participate in a defined, but not necessarily
very limited, universe of unlawful conduct-any illegality that does not
qualify as a crime or a fraud. That permission has not been articulated
often or clearly by the ABA or by state disciplinary authorities. Nor has
it been examined or addressed in any depth by legal ethics scholars and
commentators. This Article argues that lawyers have discretion to assist
or refuse to assist their clients with that type of unlawful activity. Lawyers
who choose to participate in clients' unlawful activity, taking advantage
of the state's license to do so, ought to be judged by their peers, and the
rest of the relevant community, by the nature of the harm that
participation produces and its effect on the justice of the resulting action.
297. See supra note 289 and accompanying text. Licensed lawyers such as Jonathan Shin
and Emily Haile above may be willing to accept some of the risks that, while likely very small,
remain inherent in proceeding with the interpretation of Rule 1.2(d) developed here. A not-yet-
licensed student attorney such as Anatoly Litmanovich will likely be much more risk-averse.
298. See ANTHONY TROLLOPE, THE WARDEN 25 (1964) (describing a lawyer who believes
"that he might sleep at night without pangs of conscience"); Luban, supra note 223, at 89.
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That license to collaborate with client unlawfulness is not a license to
evade moral responsibility for the acts of their clients.

